Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Mobile or software wallet
Cases in this category involve mobile apps and desktop software wallets. Recovery depends entirely on whether a seed phrase backup was made and stored independently of the device.
Mobile and software wallets are the most frequently observed custody system in this archive, reflecting their widespread use. The structural risk is consistent: where a seed phrase backup was created and stored independently of the device, recovery was possible. Where no backup existed, loss of the device meant permanent loss of access.
572 observed cases
Blocked
405 (71%)
Constrained
44 (8%)
Survives
118 (21%)
Indeterminate
5 (1%)
Passphrase unavailable — Armory (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A 2014 forum case describes a user who had encrypted their Armory wallet and stored the passphrase in a KeePass database. The KeePass master password was itself
A flood damaged the drawer contents.
Mobile or software wallet
A user who had set up a BIP38 encrypted paper wallet in 2013 stored both the encrypted paper wallet and the decryption passphrase in the same desk drawer. In Se
When moving offices in October 2014, the sticky note was lost in the move.
Mobile or software wallet
A user who had encrypted their Armory wallet stored the passphrase on a yellow sticky note on their monitor. When moving offices in October 2014, the sticky not
Seed phrase unavailable — software wallet 2014
Mobile or software wallet
A user who relied on a custodian's paper wallet service for cold storage found that the custodian had gone out of business and shredded all records, including p
Physical coercion — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
Following Bitcoin's price recovery above $400 in late 2014, a forum case documents a user threatened with violence unless they transferred BTC to the attacker's
Device lost — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A university student who had been mining Bitcoin since 2012 stored their wallet on a laptop that was confiscated by university IT security following an unrelate
By 2014 the exact capitalisation and punctuation they had used was no longer fully
Mobile or software wallet
A forum post describes a user who had created a 'mental wallet' using a brain wallet generator in 2012, planning to memorise the passphrase permanently. By 2014
An early Bitcoin miner died in December 2014, having accumulated coins since 2010.
Mobile or software wallet
An early Bitcoin miner died in December 2014, having accumulated coins since 2010. Their estate attorney discovered a reference to 'bitcoin' in handwritten note
Passphrase unavailable — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A Bitcoin miner who had encrypted their wallet with a passphrase derived from a song lyric (as recommended in a 2012 forum guide) discovered in December 2014 th
Owner incapacity — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A solo Bitcoin miner suffered a serious accident in April 2014 and was in intensive care for three weeks. Their mining rig continued running during this period,
Documentation absent — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A 2014 forum thread documents a user who inherited a hardware drive with what appeared to be Bitcoin-related files. The deceased had left no documentation of ho
Multisig quorum failure — Armory (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
An early adopter of Armory's multisig features in 2014 had set up a 2-of-3 arrangement with a friend and an exchange-hosted co-signer. When the exchange-hosted
Forced relocation — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A Bitcoin holder who was detained at a border crossing in 2014 had their mobile phone seized as part of an investigation. The phone contained the only copy of t
Owner incapacity — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A prominent early Bitcoin forum contributor was injured in a road accident in September 2014 and spent two months in rehabilitation. Their Bitcoin wallet was st
Estate access failure — software wallet (2014)
Mobile or software wallet
A 2014 estate case involved an executor who located encrypted Bitcoin wallet files on the deceased's computer but found no documentation of the encryption metho
A 2-of-2 arrangement offered no resilience against single key loss, unlike a 2-of-3
Mobile or software wallet
A Bitcoin business that stored treasury in a 2-of-2 multisig arrangement suffered a key loss when one partner's computer was damaged. The remaining partner held
Owner incapacity — software wallet 2013
Mobile or software wallet
A Bitcoin miner who was hospitalised for an extended period in 2013 was unable to access their wallet to pay medical bills in Bitcoin. The wallet was on a home
Owner incapacity — software wallet (2013)
Mobile or software wallet
A sole operator of a small Bitcoin business fell seriously ill in June 2013 and was hospitalised for six weeks. The business held BTC in an operational hot wall
Device lost — software wallet 2013
Mobile or software wallet
A user who had been mining Bitcoin through 2012 performed a clean OS reinstall in early 2013 without first exporting the wallet.dat file from the AppData direct
Device lost — software wallet 2013
Mobile or software wallet
A user's hard drive failed in 2013 due to a mechanical failure. The wallet.dat was on the failed drive and no offsite backup existed. A backup drive also stored
The BTC remained in on-chain addresses but the private keys were permanently lost.
Mobile or software wallet
A user whose home was flooded in 2013 lost a computer containing their Bitcoin wallet. Water damage destroyed the drive platters before the device could be reco
In 2013 the instance was terminated due to an unpaid hosting bill.
Mobile or software wallet
A user stored their Bitcoin wallet backup on a cloud virtual machine. In 2013 the instance was terminated due to an unpaid hosting bill. All data including the
In the process a USB drive containing a wallet backup was packed and subsequently lost.
Mobile or software wallet
A user who had accumulated BTC through mining in 2010 and 2011 moved house in 2013. In the process a USB drive containing a wallet backup was packed and subsequ
The BTC addresses remained visible on the blockchain but unspendable.
Mobile or software wallet
A user who kept their wallet.dat on an encrypted external hard drive lost the drive at some point during 2013. They had recorded the encryption key securely, bu
The wallet.dat had been in the default Bitcoin data directory which was overwritten.
Mobile or software wallet
A user who had been using a shared workplace computer for Bitcoin mining in 2012 found in 2013 that the employer had wiped and redeployed the machine. The walle
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