CustodyStress
Archive › Halving cycles › Halving Cycle 2 (2013–2016)
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Halving Cycle 2 (2013–2016)

The second halving cycle coincides with the growth of exchanges as primary custody infrastructure. Mt. Gox collapsed in 2014 and vendor lockout became a dominant stress pattern. Passphrase-related losses increased as early hardware wallets and encrypted wallets became more common. The blocked rate dropped to 58% as exchange-based constrained outcomes added a new category.

206 cases from this period are included in this archive. Exchange and custodial custody failures account for 47% of cases. 58% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome.

68
Blocked
29
Constrained
20
Survived
89
Indeterminate

83% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

206 observed cases
Blocked
68 (33%)
Constrained
29 (14%)
Survived
20 (10%)
Indeterminate
89 (43%)
Cryptsy Exchange Collapse: Concealed Hack Left Users Holding Worthless Balances
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
Cryptsy emerged as the dominant altcoin exchange during the 2013 cryptocurrency boom, facilitating trading in Litecoin, Dogecoin, Feathercoin, and hundreds of a
CoinLab vs. Mt. Gox: Partnership Collapse Traps North American Customer Bitcoin in Legal Limbo (May 2013)
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In 2012, Mt. Gox and CoinLab signed a partnership agreement under which CoinLab would assume management of Mt. Gox's US and Canadian customer operations, includ
Encrypted wallet.dat passphrase mismatch: offline wallet creation to recovery (2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In July 2013, a user created an encrypted wallet on an Ubuntu live CD and stored the wallet.dat file offline. Several months later, in December 2013, he importe
Matthew Moody: Bitcoin Miner Dies in Plane Crash, Wallet Inaccessible
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
Matthew Moody was an early Bitcoin miner who began accumulating coins during the network's nascent period when mining remained feasible on standard consumer har
13.8 BTC Lost to Forgotten Wallet.dat Password: DIY and Professional Recovery Attempts
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
A Bitcoin user created an encrypted Bitcoin Core wallet in 2013 containing 13.8 BTC. The passphrase was forgotten, rendering the wallet inaccessible. In Septemb
DHS Seizure of Mt. Gox Dwolla and Wells Fargo Accounts (May 2013)
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
On May 15, 2013, the US Department of Homeland Security, acting through Immigration and Customs Enforcement, seized approximately $2.9 million from Mt. Gox's Dw
Instawallet Hosted Wallet Shutdown After 2013 Security Breach: Partial User Reimbursement
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
Instawallet, operated by French company Paymain (later Paymium), provided frictionless Bitcoin access during the early ecosystem's rapid expansion. The service
Kristoffer Koch Recovers Forgotten 5,000 BTC Wallet After Four Years
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2009, Kristoffer Koch, a Norwegian engineering student, purchased 5,000 Bitcoin for approximately 150 Norwegian kroner (roughly $27 USD at the time) as resea
Blockchain.info iOS App Private Key Corruption: Developer Assisted One User, Denied Another
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In April 2013, a blockchain.info iOS app user transferred Bitcoin from Mt. Gox to a newly created address via blockchain.info's mobile application. The transact
TrueCrypt Volume Corruption Across All Backups: Wallet Recovery Attempt
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In 2011, a Bitcoin user created two TrueCrypt encrypted containers on Windows 7: one holding wallet.dat, the second holding unimportant files as a control. Afte
Blockchain.info Android Wallet PIN-Only Setup Access Failure (2013)
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
In June 2013, a user known as NeedChangeNow created a mobile Bitcoin wallet using Blockchain.info's Android application on a Samsung Galaxy S4 running Android 4
Blockchain.info Two-Factor Authentication Lockout: Correct Credentials Rejected
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
On April 21, 2013, Narydu, operator of bitcoinargentina.org, lost access to a Blockchain.info hosted wallet despite possessing both the correct primary password
Wallet.dat Recovery Failure After Premature Bitcoin-Qt Reinstall
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In mid-2013, a Bitcoin user operating under the handle spoonbender encountered a custody access failure rooted in device loss and procedural error during recove
Noitev's Lost Electrum Password: 1.8–1.9 BTC Recovered via Brute-Force Attack
Software wallet
Constrained 2013
On April 8, 2013, BitcoinTalk user Noitev reported losing access to an Electrum wallet holding approximately 1.8–1.9 BTC due to a forgotten password. The wallet
Electrum Legacy Seed Recovery Failure: 2013–2014 Gift Wallet Inaccessible
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
Between 2013 and 2014, alejandroaa's mother received Bitcoin from a friend and retained three pieces of documentation: a 12-word seed phrase, a 5-letter login c
Multibit Wallet Lost After Mac Reformat Without Backup
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In November 2013, a BitcoinTalk user identified as funkonaut posted about losing access to their Bitcoin holdings following a critical self-inflicted data loss
Bitcoin-Qt Wallet Loss: Executable Backup Without Private Key File (2013)
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
TheD1ceMan, a forum user, experienced an irrecoverable loss of approximately 1.8 BTC (valued at $2,300–$2,700 USD at May 2013 market prices) due to a critical m
BitcoinTalk User RTQ1154 Locks 78 BTC Behind Mistyped Wallet Password
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In June 2013, a BitcoinTalk forum user identifying as RTQ1154 posted in a community thread titled 'Let's add up the KNOWN lost bitcoins' describing a custody lo
James Howells and the Landfill Bitcoin: Device Lost, Recovery Legally Blocked
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
James Howells, a UK resident, discarded a hard drive containing an encrypted Bitcoin wallet during a routine office clearance in 2013. The device was disposed o
Australian Miner Loses Early Bitcoin When Sole USB Backup Drive Fails Irrecoverably
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
Alex, an Australian Bitcoin miner based in Melbourne, mined Bitcoin around 2010 when mining was still a hobbyist activity with negligible monetary value. Unlike
Bomben Recovers 2013 Bitcoin Wallet Locked by Nonstandard Private Key Encoding
Software wallet
Survived 2013
Bomben created a Bitcoin wallet in 2013 using software that implemented a nonstandard encoding for private keys, diverging from the Wallet Import Format (WIF) s
Passphrase unavailable — Bitcoin-Qt (2013)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In April 2013, a BitcoinTalk user identified as 'veryveryinteresting' posted in topic 85495, the community's primary encrypted wallet recovery thread, describin
BitcoinTalk User 'Liquid': 30 BTC Inaccessible Due to Forgotten Bitcoin-Qt Encryption Password
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In June 2013, a BitcoinTalk forum user operating under the handle 'Liquid' posted in the encrypted wallet recovery thread (topic 85495) describing an inaccessib
Hidden wallet discovered — Bitcoin-Qt (2013)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In November 2013, BitcoinTalk user nobbie discovered that Bitcoin-Qt's wallet encryption feature had been activated, locking access to the wallet with a passwor
Passphrase unavailable — Bitcoin-Qt (2013)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In April 2013, a BitcoinTalk user identified as 'legitnick' posted in topic 85495, the primary community support thread for locked wallet recovery during the 20
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Halving cycles
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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