CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Halving Cycle 2 (2013–2016)

The second halving cycle coincides with the growth of exchanges as primary custody infrastructure. Mt. Gox collapsed in 2014 and vendor lockout became a dominant stress pattern. Passphrase-related losses increased as early hardware wallets and encrypted wallets became more common. The blocked rate dropped to 58% as exchange-based constrained outcomes added a new category.

206 cases from this period are included in this archive. Exchange and custodial custody failures account for 47% of cases. 58% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome.

Archive analysis — 206 cases
Outcomes
58% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 11 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. 25% resulted in constrained recovery.
Documentation coverage
43% of cases have indeterminate outcomes — higher than the archive average of 43%.
Custody type
51% of cases involved software wallet, followed by exchange custody at 47%.
Documentation
47% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Structural dependency
62% of cases carry a undocumented recovery procedure dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
68
Blocked
29
Constrained
20
Survived
89
Indeterminate

83% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

206 observed cases
Blocked
68 (33%)
Constrained
29 (14%)
Survived
20 (10%)
Indeterminate
89 (43%)
Bitcoin Core Fatal Error After Moving Block Folder: wallet.dat Accessible But Program Won't Launch
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In December 2016, a Bitcoin Core user installed the software on their PC and began purchasing Bitcoin before full blockchain synchronization was complete. Appro
Armory Desktop Wallet: 2 BTC Inaccessible Despite Paper and Encrypted Backups
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
A user purchased 2 BTC via Coinbase approximately 2013–2014 and transferred them to a self-hosted Armory wallet running on a personal server. The transfer compl
Deceased Bitcoin Miner: Funds Locked on Coinbase, Lost on SnapCard Closure
Exchange custody
Blocked 2016
A Bitcoin miner died intestate in 2016, leaving behind mining equipment and active cryptocurrency accounts on Coinbase and SnapCard, a now-defunct wallet servic
Incomplete Electrum Seed Phrase: 0.032 BTC Inaccessible Since 2016
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In December 2024, a BitcoinTalk user (winnerorlooser) disclosed a custody failure spanning eight years. Around 2016, the user transferred 0.032 BTC from an obso
75 BTC Access Loss: Bitcoin Core Wallet Reset Without Backup (2016)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In 2016, forum user bridget1 installed Bitcoin Core v0.13.0 and deposited 75 BTC into the newly created wallet. At the time, 75 BTC had a market value of approx
CHBTC Bitcoin Withdrawal Suspension Under PBOC Regulatory Order (February–mid-2016)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
In late January and early February 2016, China's People's Bank (PBOC) convened meetings with major Bitcoin exchanges to mandate upgraded Know Your Customer (KYC
Rafel Marcel: Bitcoin Acquired via BitX in 2016, Seed Phrase Never Recorded
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
Rafel Marcel purchased Bitcoin approximately ten years prior to March 2026—around late 2016—through an exchange called BitX (later rebranded as Luno). A friend
Block.io Permanent Loss: Forgotten PIN and Missing Secret Mnemonic Backup
Exchange custody
Blocked 2016
In February 2016, a BitcoinTalk user identifying as CaRLoSXXX posted a distress message after losing access to their Block.io wallet. Block.io is a non-custodia
Cryptsy Exchange: 13,000 BTC Theft Concealed, Ponzi Operations, Founder Flight (2014–2016)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
Cryptsy, a Florida-based cryptocurrency exchange operated by Paul Vernon (online alias 'Big Vern'), suffered a critical security breach in July 2014 when attack
Poloniex Suspends New Hampshire Operations, Forces User Withdrawals by October 6, 2016
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
In September 2016, Poloniex, a major US-based cryptocurrency exchange known for altcoin trading, announced a service suspension affecting all New Hampshire resi
7.8 BTC Lost in Blockchain.info Interface Failure After Platform Upgrade
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2016
In February 2016, a user created two cryptocurrency addresses within Blockchain.info's hosted web wallet service and sent test transactions from Bitcoin-Qt to b
Cointrader Exchange Discovers Bitcoin Shortfall, Suspends Operations Indefinitely (March 2016)
Exchange custody
Blocked 2016
Cointrader operated as a Canadian cryptocurrency exchange with modest activity through early 2016, processing approximately 81 BTC in daily trading volume durin
OKCoin Bitcoin Withdrawal Freeze: PBOC Regulatory Action Extends 4 Months (February–June 2016)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
The People's Bank of China initiated regulatory inspections of OKCoin, Huobi, and BTCC in early January 2016, identifying serious compliance gaps: illegal margi
Bitcurex Exchange Collapse: 2,300 BTC Lost, No Customer Database Backups
Exchange custody
Blocked 2016
Bitcurex launched in 2012 as Poland's first and largest Bitcoin exchange, processing over $50 million in BTC transactions during its final six months. The platf
Passphrase unavailable — Bitcoin Core, Finland (2016)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
On February 5, 2016, a user identifying as mikkihiiri posted in the Bitcoin Technical Support section of BitcoinTalk seeking help to recover access to an encryp
Block.io Custodial Lockout: 2FA Authentication Failure and Support-Dependent Recovery
Exchange custody
Survived 2016
On January 18, 2016, a BitcoinTalk user identified as 'statue' reported being locked out of their Block.io online wallet after entering an incorrect two-factor
1,000+ BTC Permanently Lost: Multiple Hard Drive Formats Destroyed Wallet Data
Software wallet
Blocked 2016
In 2009, a teenager claiming to be an early Bitcoin adopter received over 1,000 BTC allegedly directly from Satoshi Nakamoto. The user stored the wallet on a de
Lost Electrum Wallet Password (2 BTC) – No Recovery Path Identified
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In September 2016, a BitcoinTalk forum user with username Ashkaan posted a public bounty request seeking professional assistance to recover access to an Electru
Encrypted Wallet Recovery Without Passphrase: pywallet's Hard Limit
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In April 2016, BitcoinTalk user sparkybtc posted about recovering cryptocurrency from a formatted hard drive containing Bitcoin CPU-mined around 2011 and Dogeco
Smartphone Wallet Reset Without Backup: 15 BTC Private Key Unverified
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In November 2016, a user identified as 'Farer' created a Bitcoin wallet on a smartphone and accumulated 15 bitcoins. Approximately one year later, the user rese
Kevin Durant Locked Out of Coinbase Bitcoin Account for 9 Years After 2016 Purchase
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
Kevin Durant purchased Bitcoin on Coinbase in September 2016 at approximately $650 per coin, following repeated conversations with Golden State Warriors teammat
Gatecoin Exchange: 250 BTC and 185,000 ETH Drained via Cold Storage Routing Compromise
Exchange custody
Blocked 2016
Gatecoin Limited operated as a Hong Kong-based cryptocurrency exchange from 2013, gaining credibility through backing by the Hong Kong Science and Technology Pa
Huobi Bitcoin Withdrawal Freeze: 4-Month Regulatory Lockout (February–June 2016)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
Huobi, one of China's largest cryptocurrency exchanges, was subject to a January 2016 People's Bank of China (PBOC) inspection that also targeted OKCoin and BTC
BTCC and Major Chinese Exchanges Freeze Bitcoin Withdrawals Under PBOC Compliance (Feb–Jun 2016)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
BTCC (BTCChina), founded in 2011 and led by CEO Bobby Lee, was one of the world's oldest and largest Bitcoin exchanges. In January 2016, the People's Bank of Ch
Electrum Wallet Password Loss: 4 BTC Inaccessible Without Seed Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2016
On April 6, 2016, Andi300 posted on forum.bitcoin.com describing an immediate custody failure: the user had just received 4 BTC but was unable to send or access
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Halving cycles
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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