CustodyStress
Archive › Documentation status › Present and Interpretable
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Present and Interpretable

Cases where documentation was available and interpretable but other barriers prevented recovery.

Even where documentation was present and interpretable, 62% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome. Documentation reduces but does not eliminate access failure — in many cases the constraint was technical or institutional rather than informational.

174
Blocked
54
Constrained
51
Survived
20
Indeterminate

82% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

299 observed cases
Blocked
174 (58%)
Constrained
54 (18%)
Survived
51 (17%)
Indeterminate
20 (7%)
Kleiman Estate v. Craig Wright: Bitcoin Access Blocked by Knowledge Concentration
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2018
David Kleiman, a computer forensics expert in Palm Beach County, Florida, died in April 2013. His brother Ira Kleiman later alleged that David and Craig Steven
Danny Aston Home Invasion: UK's First Documented Crypto-Targeted Physical Attack — 2018
Unknown custody system
Indeterminate 2018
On an unspecified date in 2018, four armed men invaded the Moulsford, Oxfordshire residence of cryptocurrency trader Danny Aston. The assault was motivated by a
Matthew Mellon's $193M XRP Estate: Cold Wallets, No Keys, No Plan
Hardware wallet (single key)
Constrained 2018
Matthew Mellon, a member of the prominent Mellon banking family, became a significant cryptocurrency investor in the mid-2010s. His $2 million investment in XRP
Cointed GmbH Exchange Collapse: Austria, 2018 — Customer Funds Disappeared
Exchange custody
Blocked 2018
Cointed GmbH, founded in 2016 in Kufstein, Austria, operated as a regional cryptocurrency powerhouse: a custodial exchange, mining operation, and operator of on
Coincheck Exchange Hack: 523 Million NEM Stolen, User Withdrawals Frozen
Exchange custody
Constrained 2018
On January 26, 2018, Coincheck, a Tokyo-based cryptocurrency exchange, discovered that attackers had stolen approximately 523 million NEM tokens valued at $530
Coinrail Exchange Hack — $40 Million Altcoin Loss, Partial Recovery
Exchange custody
Constrained 2018
On June 10, 2018, Coinrail, a South Korean cryptocurrency exchange, publicly confirmed a security breach affecting its hot wallet infrastructure. Attackers gain
Cryptocurrency Traders Robbed at Gunpoint in Moulsford, Oxfordshire
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2018
Danny Aston and Amy Jay, cryptocurrency traders operating in the UK, were victims of armed robbery in Moulsford, Oxfordshire. The perpetrators held them at gunp
MapleChange Exit Scam: 919 Bitcoin Lost, CEO Identified as Glad Poenaru
Exchange custody
Blocked 2018
MapleChange, a small Canadian cryptocurrency exchange, announced on October 28, 2018 that it had suffered a catastrophic hack. According to the exchange's Twitt
Bithumb $31 Million Hack — June 2018 Withdrawal Suspension
Exchange custody
Constrained 2018
Bithumb, one of South Korea's dominant cryptocurrency exchanges handling billions in daily trading volume, discovered a security breach on June 19, 2018. Intern
Elvis Cavalic and QuadrigaCX: C$15,000 Withdrawal Lost to Exchange Collapse
Exchange custody
Blocked 2018
Elvis Cavalic of Calgary, Alberta was an active QuadrigaCX customer who had accumulated cryptocurrency holdings through trading on the platform. In October 2018
Zaif Exchange Hack: 5,966 BTC Stolen, User Funds Frozen (September 2018)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2018
On September 14, 2018, the Zaif cryptocurrency exchange operated by Tech Bureau Corp suffered a significant hot wallet breach. Attackers gained unauthorized acc
Blockchain.info Wallet Access Failure: Platform Login System Change (2017)
Exchange custody
Survived 2017
In March 2014, a user created a Blockchain.info-hosted wallet and received a 12-word recovery passphrase as the sole access credential. The user documented the
Yapizon Exchange Hack (April 2017): 3,831 BTC Stolen, Socialised Loss Model Applied to All Users
Exchange custody
Blocked 2017
On April 22, 2017, Yapizon, a South Korean cryptocurrency exchange, suffered a security breach resulting in the theft of 3,831 BTC—approximately 37% of the exch
Youbit Exchange Bankruptcy: Second Hack Triggers 75% Fund Recovery Limit
Exchange custody
Constrained 2017
Youbit, operated by South Korean firm Yapian, experienced two significant security breaches during 2017. The first attack in April 2017 compromised approximatel
Mark Frauenfelder's 7.4 BTC: Seed Phrase Discarded by Housecleaner, Recovered via Hardware Vulnerability
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
Mark Frauenfelder, editor-in-chief of Boing Boing and Wired contributor, purchased 7.4 Bitcoin in January 2016 for approximately $3,000 and transferred it to a
Alexander Halavais: Forgotten Password on 2010 Experimental Bitcoin Purchase
Software wallet
Blocked 2017
Alexander Halavais, an Associate Professor in the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Arizona State University, purchased a small quantity of Bitcoin ar
Blockchain.info Watch-Only Import Without Private Key Retention
Exchange custody
Blocked 2017
In June 2017, a Bitcoin Talk forum user (amirheavy666) discovered that approximately 0.00027375 BTC accumulated on a Blockchain.info wallet created around 2014
BTC-e Exchange Seized by U.S. DOJ: 1 Million Users Lose Access (July 2017)
Exchange custody
Blocked 2017
BTC-e, founded in 2011 and headquartered in Russia, operated as an unlicensed money transmitter for six years, processing over $9 billion in cryptocurrency tran
Blockchain.info 2FA Email Delivery Failure — December 2017 Access Lock
Exchange custody
Constrained 2017
In early December 2017, the user crando discovered they could not access their Blockchain.info hosted wallet after the platform failed to deliver two-factor aut
Wallet.dat Corruption After Accidental Drive Format — Recovery via Data Recovery and Pywallet
Software wallet
Survived 2017
In July 2017, AleksTo, a newcomer to Bitcoin, accidentally formatted their hard drive, destroying the only local copy of their wallet.dat file. The user immedia
Jaxx Mobile Wallet — Permanent Loss After Android Factory Reset Without Seed Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2017
In September 2017, a BitcoinTalk user (Mikekom) reported installing the Jaxx wallet application on an Android smartphone to hold Bitcoin earned by their 13-year
Armed Kidnapping for Hardware Wallet Access: $1.8M Ether Theft — New York 2017
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Survived 2017
On November 4, 2017, Louis Meza, 35, of Jersey City, New Jersey, orchestrated a sophisticated attack against a personal acquaintance in New York City. Meza arra
Brazilian Bitcoin Miner's Wife Kidnapped for Ransom — 2017 Florianopolis Case
Unknown custody system
Indeterminate 2017
In 2017, a Brazilian Bitcoin miner based in Florianopolis became the subject of local media profiles highlighting his cryptocurrency fortune accumulated through
Forgot Trezor PIN and Seed Words: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In 2017, during Bitcoin's price surge, a user documented their experience losing access to a Trezor hardware wallet containing approximately $30,000 in Bitcoin.
Forgotten Trezor PIN and Lost Seed Words: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In 2017, a Bitcoin holder using a Trezor hardware wallet lost access to approximately $30,000 worth of Bitcoin after forgetting both the device PIN and the back
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Documentation status
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.