CustodyStress
Archive › Documentation status › Present and Interpretable
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Present and Interpretable

Cases where documentation was available and interpretable but other barriers prevented recovery.

Even where documentation was present and interpretable, 62% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome. Documentation reduces but does not eliminate access failure — in many cases the constraint was technical or institutional rather than informational.

174
Blocked
54
Constrained
51
Survived
20
Indeterminate

82% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

299 observed cases
Blocked
174 (58%)
Constrained
54 (18%)
Survived
51 (17%)
Indeterminate
20 (7%)
80 BTC Recovery After Hard Drive Format: Pywallet Raw Data Reconstruction
Software wallet
Survived 2011
In December 2011, a BitcoinTalk user's friend experienced critical wallet inaccessibility when his computer crashed. The friend brought the machine to a technic
30+ BTC Sent to Wrong Address in 2011: Private Key Never Located
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2011
In 2011, blocparty_ received approximately 30 BTC from an exchange and transferred the amount (minus fees) to what they believed was a secondary address of thei
Wallet File Swap Causes Transaction Invisibility: Blockchain Index Desynchronization (2011)
Software wallet
Survived 2011
Michael_S was running Bitcoin client version 0.3.19 on Ubuntu Linux in May 2011 and sought to improve security by splitting his holdings across two wallet.dat f
Bitcointalk User Locks Self Out of Bitcoin Core Wallet After Forgetting Encryption Passphrase
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In 2011, a user on the Bitcointalk forum reported having encrypted their Bitcoin Core wallet.dat file with a passphrase—a security practice recommended at the t
Davyd Arakhamia Loses 400 BTC After Deleting Encrypted Key File
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
Davyd Arakhamia, a Ukrainian entrepreneur and later member of the Verkhovna Rada (elected 2019), accumulated approximately 400 BTC through a business that accep
26 BTC Lost: Developer Formats Drive Containing Wallet, Gives to Mother-in-Law
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In October 2021, a Hacker News user identified as jakewins disclosed a significant custody failure from the early Bitcoin era. The user possessed 26 BTC stored
Brad Yasar: Early Miner Locks Out Thousands of BTC Across Multiple Drives
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined thousands of Bitcoin on several desktop computers during the earliest years of the network when solo mining
Seed unavailable — software wallet (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
On July 14, 2010, a BitcoinTalk user with the handle ksd5 reported a critical loss in a forum thread posted just two days after account creation. The user held
9,000 BTC Lost to Unrebacked Change Address: Early Bitcoin Wallet Flaw (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In August 2010, a Bitcoin user purchased 9,000 BTC and conducted a single test transaction: sending 1 BTC to his own address to confirm network functionality. T
8,999 BTC Lost to Non-Deterministic Wallet Change Address Design
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In 2010, a Bitcoin user held approximately 9,000 BTC in a Bitcoin Core wallet. To validate his backup and recovery procedure, he executed a test transaction to
Stone Man Loses 8,999 BTC to Unbacked Change Address After Live CD Shutdown
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In August 2010, a BitcoinTalk user known as Stone Man purchased 9,000 BTC on an exchange and transferred them to a Bitcoin client running on a Debian Linux live
PC Miner Overwrites wallet.dat During OS Reinstall, Loses ~12 BTC (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In 2010, the user known as 'kingcharles' was mining Bitcoin on a personal computer during the currency's early adoption phase. At that time, mined bitcoins were
Kristoffer Koch Recovers 5000 BTC After Forgotten Wallet Password — 2013
Software wallet
Survived 2009
Kristoffer Koch, a Norwegian engineering student, encountered Bitcoin in late 2009 while researching encryption for his university thesis. Intrigued by the emer
7500 BTC Permanently Locked on IronKey Device After Passphrase Loss
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Blocked
A British engineer encrypted approximately 7500 BTC on an IronKey device, a third-party encrypted storage solution designed with progressive lockout mechanisms
Stefan Thomas: 7,200 Bitcoin Inaccessible Behind IronKey Passphrase
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Blocked
Stefan Thomas, former Chief Technology Officer of Ripple, stored 7,200 BTC on an IronKey encrypted hard drive. The drive implemented a deliberate security const
James Howells' 7,500 Bitcoin: Hard Drive Lost in Newport Landfill
Software wallet
Blocked
James Howells, a software engineer in Newport, South Wales, accidentally discarded a hard drive containing approximately 7,500 to 8,000 Bitcoin in the early 201
Executor Locked Out: Blockchain.com Wallet After Probate, Email Account Dead
Exchange custody
Blocked
A man's father passed away, leaving behind login credentials and a Bitcoin address recorded in estate documentation. During the multi-year probate process—compl
Mycelium Mobile Wallet Glitch: Bitcoin Inaccessible Despite Blockchain Confirmation
Software wallet
Blocked
In February 2020, a Bitcoin user purchased coins on the Mycelium mobile wallet application. Shortly after the purchase, the user attempted to create a backup bu
Blockchain.com Account Lockup: 8-Month Custody Freeze Despite Verified Funds
Exchange custody
Blocked
In summer 2022, an individual opened a hosted wallet account on Blockchain.com and completed full KYC verification, achieving the platform's highest transaction
Stefan Thomas: 7,002 Bitcoin on IronKey S200, Passphrase Lost, 2 Attempts Remaining
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Blocked
Stefan Thomas possessed an IronKey S200 USB drive containing the private keys to 7,002 Bitcoin, worth approximately $235 million at the time of public reporting
Notepad Backup Illusion: Seed Phrases Lost After Mobile Phone Firmware Reset
Software wallet
Blocked
A cryptocurrency holder maintained seed phrases for Bitcoin, Monero, and Ethereum in a notepad application on their mobile phone. The strategy reflected a funda
UK Court Blocks Landfill Excavation for Lost Bitcoin Hard Drive
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked
A Bitcoin holder in the United Kingdom accidentally discarded a hard drive containing an unknown quantity of Bitcoin among household waste. The device was trans
MtGox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 Bitcoin Custody Failure
Exchange custody
Blocked
Mt. Gox, founded in 2006 and operating as a Bitcoin exchange from 2010, accumulated custody of approximately 850,000 Bitcoin belonging to its users by early 201
Fault Injection Attack Recovers $2M From Trezor One After Total Credential Loss
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived
A Bitcoin holder with over $2 million stored on a Trezor One hardware wallet lost access to the device after forgetting both the PIN and seed phrase. Without th
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Documentation status
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.