CustodyStress
Archive › Documentation status › Present and Interpretable
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Present and Interpretable

Cases where documentation was available and interpretable but other barriers prevented recovery.

Even where documentation was present and interpretable, 62% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome. Documentation reduces but does not eliminate access failure — in many cases the constraint was technical or institutional rather than informational.

174
Blocked
54
Constrained
51
Survived
20
Indeterminate

82% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

299 observed cases
Blocked
174 (58%)
Constrained
54 (18%)
Survived
51 (17%)
Indeterminate
20 (7%)
Rahazan Develops and Shares PowerShell Wallet Recovery Script (2013)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In 2013, a BitcoinTalk user identifying as Rahazan faced a common early custody problem: an encrypted Bitcoin-Qt wallet with a forgotten passphrase. Rather than
BitcoinTalk User kentt Recovers Encrypted Wallet via Community Brute-Force Script (June 2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In June 2013, BitcoinTalk user kentt posted confirmation of a successful wallet recovery using community-developed brute-force scripts circulated in topic 85495
125 BTC Lost on SSD After Windows Reinstall Without Backup
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
Robert23 reported on January 5, 2012, that they had lost access to 125 BTC stored in a wallet.dat file after performing a clean Windows reinstall on an SSD driv
Intersango Exchange Collapse: 2000 BTC User Funds Retained by Operator — Norman v. Strateman
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
Intersango, a UK-based Bitcoin exchange co-founded by Amir Taaki and Patrick Strateman, ceased operations in 2012 after losing its banking relationship. At the
Deep Freeze Software Erases Bitcoin Wallet.dat Before Incoming Payment
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
In September 2012, a Bitcoin user operating under the handle blackjhon909 discovered that their Bitcoin wallet had become inaccessible following an unexpected s
250 BTC Lost After Windows Profile Deletion and Repeated System Restore Overwrites
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
In early 2012, a Windows user operating under the handle kentrolla reported losing access to a Bitcoin wallet containing approximately 250 BTC. The wallet.dat f
1,300 BTC Inaccessible: BitLocker Encryption Key Lost on Failed Flash Drive
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
In June 2012, forum user mb300sd disclosed on BitcoinTalk's 'known lost bitcoins' thread that approximately 1,300 BTC had become permanently inaccessible due to
Early CPU Miner Loses 27,000 BTC to Unrecoverable Drive Failure
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Dalkore mined 27,000 BTC during Bitcoin's earliest period using CPU mining, when the network was still in its first year and coins carried no meaningful market
CryptoXChange Exchange Collapse: Users Locked Out of Bitcoin Deposits
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
CryptoXChange launched on November 10, 2011, as an Australian Bitcoin exchange offering two-factor authentication features including Yubikey support. The platfo
Opticbit Loses 2 BTC After CyanogenMod 9 Flash Without Locatable Wallet Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
On June 25, 2012, a Bitcoin user operating under the handle opticbit reported the loss of 2 BTC stored in a mobile wallet on an Android phone. The loss occurred
Campbell Simpson Discards 1,400 BTC on Failing Hard Drive Without Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Campbell Simpson, editor of Gizmodo Australia, purchased approximately 1,400 Bitcoin in early 2010 when a single coin traded for roughly 1.5 cents, investing ar
BTCex Unexpected Maintenance Closure and Permanent Platform Shutdown (July 2012)
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
BTCex operated as a custodial Bitcoin exchange during the early market period. In May 2011, the platform suffered a critical security breach resulting in the lo
BitMarket.eu: Operator Speculation and Bitcoinica Collapse Froze 18,787 BTC in Customer Funds
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
BitMarket.eu launched in April 2011 as a Polish peer-to-peer Bitcoin exchange. The platform operator, Maciej Trębacz, made a critical decision to invest custome
Bitcoinica Receivership: 98,000 BTC Lost Across Three Thefts and MtGox Collapse
Exchange custody
Constrained 2012
Bitcoinica, a Bitcoin margin trading platform incorporated as a New Zealand limited partnership and launched by Zhou Tong in September 2011, suffered a cascade
Brad Yasar: Desktop-Mined Bitcoin Locked by Forgotten Passwords
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined Bitcoin on multiple desktop computers during the network's earliest years when mining was accessible to indi
BitFloor Exchange Collapse: 24,000 BTC Theft, Minimal Restitution, Platform Shutdown
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
BitFloor, a Bitcoin exchange operating in 2012, suffered a catastrophic custody failure on September 4, 2012. An attacker gained access to an unencrypted backup
Tradehill Exchange Shutdown: Users Locked Out After Dwolla Payment Reversal
Exchange custody
Constrained 2012
Tradehill operated as one of Bitcoin's earliest and most prominent exchanges, second only to Mt. Gox in trading volume and user trust. On February 13, 2012, the
Wallet Encryption Without Post-Encryption Backup: 5 BTC Change Address Lost
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
In December 2012, a BitcoinTalk user reported a custody failure involving wallet encryption and backup timing. The user had received 10 BTC across two transacti
Formatted Computer, Lost Wallet.dat Access—Recovered via Time Machine Backup
Software wallet
Survived 2011
On July 3, 2011, forum user Omega0255 reported a critical custody error with a 1 BTC mining pool payment. The user had formatted their SSD drive using a secure
Corrupted wallet.dat Recovery After Hard Drive Failure: 2011 Case Study
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2011
In May 2011, forum user zrataj (John) experienced a critical storage failure when his hard drive crashed, destroying both his primary wallet.dat file and the ba
Gabriel Abed: 800 BTC Private Keys Destroyed by Accidental Laptop Reformat
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In 2011, Gabriel Abed, co-founder of Bitt and a prominent figure in Caribbean blockchain infrastructure, lost approximately 800 BTC when a colleague accidentall
Bitomat.pl Exchange Loses 17,000 BTC to AWS Instance Restart
Exchange custody
Constrained 2011
Bitomat.pl operated as the third-largest Bitcoin exchange globally and the largest in Poland during the early 2011 cryptocurrency market. On July 26, 2011, the
BTCex Exchange Users Discover 83% Bitcoin Missing After Temporary Closure
Exchange custody
Blocked 2011
BTCex was a Russian-based cryptocurrency exchange founded in September 2010 that facilitated trades between bitcoin and fiat currencies including Russian Rubles
Stefan Thomas and 7,002 Bitcoin: Locked Behind a Forgotten Passphrase
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2011
Stefan Thomas held 7,002 Bitcoin stored on an encrypted hard drive containing the private keys. Access to the device required a passphrase that Thomas had forgo
Ulti Loses 28 BTC to Incomplete SSD Migration — October 2011
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
On October 1, 2011, a Bitcointalk user identified as Ulti posted an account of a custody failure resulting from routine hardware maintenance. While upgrading hi
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Documentation status
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.