Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
2011
The first major price cycle, peaking near $30 before collapsing to under $2. Exchange failures and wallet software immaturity account for a significant share of incidents from this year.
34 cases from 2011 are included in this archive. 81% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome. The most frequently observed stress condition is device-loss cases.
86% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.
34 observed cases
KnightMB: 370,000 BTC Accumulated in Early Mining, Sold or Lost to Access Failure
Software wallet
Indeterminate
2011
KnightMB, a pseudonymous user on Bitcointalk, posted in 2011 documenting an accumulation of over 370,000 BTC acquired through mining and pool operation during 2
AWS EC2 and Local VM Wallet Deletion: Early Backup Failure Pattern
Software wallet
Blocked
2011
In May 2011, BitcoinTalk user opticbit reported losing approximately 0.01 BTC stored on an AWS EC2 instance that was subsequently deleted, and an additional sma
BitcoinTalk User 'td' Loses 50 BTC Mined Block After Deleting Wallet Without Backup
Software wallet
Blocked
2011
In May 2011, a BitcoinTalk forum user identified as 'td' reported the loss of 50 BTC—the full block reward from a successfully mined block. At the time of loss,
Davyd Arakhamia Loses 400 BTC After Deleting Encrypted Key File
Software wallet
Blocked
2011
Davyd Arakhamia, a Ukrainian entrepreneur and later member of the Verkhovna Rada (elected 2019), accumulated approximately 400 BTC through a business that accep
Fragmented Wallet.dat Recovery: Disk Image Mining Loss Without Backup
Software wallet
Indeterminate
2011
In 2011–2012, callerman used Bitcoin-QT to mine Bitcoin on a personal computer with limited technical knowledge of cryptocurrency infrastructure. Facing disk sp
Lost Bitcoin from 2011 Dialcoin Purchase — Wallet Unknown, Documentation Discarded
Unknown custody system
Blocked
2011
In May 2017, a Bitcoin Stack Exchange user identified as David posted about bitcoins purchased in 2011 from Dialcoin, a now-defunct early exchange platform. Dav
26 BTC Lost: Developer Formats Drive Containing Wallet, Gives to Mother-in-Law
Software wallet
Blocked
2011
In October 2021, a Hacker News user identified as jakewins disclosed a significant custody failure from the early Bitcoin era. The user possessed 26 BTC stored
MyBitcoin.com Custody Collapse (July 2011): 78,747 BTC Lost, Partial Refund, Operator Never Identified
Exchange custody
Blocked
2011
MyBitcoin.com, launched in 2010, became one of the first popular custodial Bitcoin web wallet services at a time when hardware wallets did not exist and self-cu
Brad Yasar: Early Miner Locks Out Thousands of BTC Across Multiple Drives
Software wallet
Blocked
2011
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined thousands of Bitcoin on several desktop computers during the earliest years of the network when solo mining
Outcome terms
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Assessment terms
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?
Inclusion requirements
A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:
- Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
- Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
- Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
In scope
- Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
- Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
- Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
- Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
- Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
- Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
- Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
- Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
- Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
- Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
- Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
- Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
Out of scope
- Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
- Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
- Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
- Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
- Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
- Deliberate burns or tribute burns
- Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described
Source and verification
Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.
The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.