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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Cycle 2Vendor lockout

Halving Cycle 2 (2013–2016) — Vendor lockout

Exchange and platform failures from Halving Cycle 2 (2013–2016). The Mt. Gox collapse in February 2014 — approximately 850,000 BTC frozen — defines this category. The extended bear market produced a wave of further exchange closures.

63 cases in this intersection. 62% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome and 4% in access survived. The most common recovery path is exchange support.

32
Blocked
18
Constrained
2
Survived
11
Indeterminate

96% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

63 observed cases
Blocked
32 (51%)
Constrained
18 (29%)
Survived
2 (3%)
Indeterminate
11 (17%)
Cryptsy Exchange Collapse: Concealed Hack Left Users Holding Worthless Balances
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
Cryptsy emerged as the dominant altcoin exchange during the 2013 cryptocurrency boom, facilitating trading in Litecoin, Dogecoin, Feathercoin, and hundreds of a
Instawallet Hosted Wallet Shutdown After 2013 Security Breach: Partial User Reimbursement
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
Instawallet, operated by French company Paymain (later Paymium), provided frictionless Bitcoin access during the early ecosystem's rapid expansion. The service
Blockchain.info iOS App Private Key Corruption: Developer Assisted One User, Denied Another
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In April 2013, a blockchain.info iOS app user transferred Bitcoin from Mt. Gox to a newly created address via blockchain.info's mobile application. The transact
Blockchain.info Android Wallet PIN-Only Setup Access Failure (2013)
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
In June 2013, a user known as NeedChangeNow created a mobile Bitcoin wallet using Blockchain.info's Android application on a Samsung Galaxy S4 running Android 4
Blockchain.info Two-Factor Authentication Lockout: Correct Credentials Rejected
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
On April 21, 2013, Narydu, operator of bitcoinargentina.org, lost access to a Blockchain.info hosted wallet despite possessing both the correct primary password
Mt. Gox SEPA Withdrawal Vanishes: mably's €EUR Transfer Confirmed But Never Received
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
On April 6, 2013, BitcoinTalk user mably received email confirmation from Mt. Gox that a SEPA EUR withdrawal had been initiated. Twenty days elapsed without the
Mt. Gox SEPA Withdrawal Delayed 28 Days: lukcoin's Unresolved Case (May 2013)
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
On May 7, 2013, BitcoinTalk user lukcoin posted in the Mt. Gox withdrawal delays thread describing a SEPA transfer initiated on April 9 that had not arrived aft
Institutional lockout — Mt. Gox (2013)
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
On April 8, 2013, BitcoinTalk Legendary-ranked user el_rlee submitted a withdrawal request to Mt. Gox. Twelve days later, on April 20, el_rlee posted in a gathe
Mt. Gox Bitcoin Withdrawal Crisis: Weeks-Long Delays Signal Terminal Operational Failure
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
By November 2013, Mt. Gox customers attempting to withdraw Bitcoin faced indefinite waiting periods, a critical escalation from earlier fiat-only delays. What h
Inputs.io Hack: 4,100 BTC Stolen, Partial Refunds October 2013
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
Inputs.io was an Australian-hosted Bitcoin wallet service operated by a developer known as TradeFortress. On October 23, 2013, the platform suffered a security
Blockchain.info Web Wallet (2013): Silent Login Failure, Unresolved After 3 Months
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In late 2013, a user created a Bitcoin wallet on blockchain.info, then one of the most popular web-based custodial platforms. The wallet remained accessible dur
Blockchain.info Web Wallet: Imported Private Key Vanished After Sync Popup
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In February 2013, a BitcoinTalk user (BurtW) generated a vanity address using vanitygen and imported the private key into his Blockchain.info web wallet account
Blockchain.info Access Blocked After Platform Software Update
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
A Blockchain.info user experienced sudden access denial to their hosted wallet following a platform software update. The incident occurred in an era when web-ba
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Browse by halving cycle and stress
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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