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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Device-Dependent AccessExchange custody

Device-Dependent Access — Exchange custody

Cases where accessing an exchange account required a specific device for two-factor authentication or email access, with no recovery fallback.

24% of all Exchange custody cases in the archive involve this structural dependency. The blocked rate among them is 77% — 8 points above the archive-wide blocked rate of 69%. The most common recovery path is exchange support.

20
Blocked
4
Constrained
2
Survived
37
Indeterminate

92% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

63 observed cases
Blocked
20 (32%)
Constrained
4 (6%)
Survived
2 (3%)
Indeterminate
37 (59%)
Blockchain.info iOS App Private Key Corruption: Developer Assisted One User, Denied Another
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In April 2013, a blockchain.info iOS app user transferred Bitcoin from Mt. Gox to a newly created address via blockchain.info's mobile application. The transact
Blockchain.info Android Wallet PIN-Only Setup Access Failure (2013)
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
In June 2013, a user known as NeedChangeNow created a mobile Bitcoin wallet using Blockchain.info's Android application on a Samsung Galaxy S4 running Android 4
Blockchain.info Two-Factor Authentication Lockout: Correct Credentials Rejected
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
On April 21, 2013, Narydu, operator of bitcoinargentina.org, lost access to a Blockchain.info hosted wallet despite possessing both the correct primary password
Blockchain.info Web Wallet (2013): Silent Login Failure, Unresolved After 3 Months
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In late 2013, a user created a Bitcoin wallet on blockchain.info, then one of the most popular web-based custodial platforms. The wallet remained accessible dur
Blockchain.info Web Wallet: Imported Private Key Vanished After Sync Popup
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In February 2013, a BitcoinTalk user (BurtW) generated a vanity address using vanitygen and imported the private key into his Blockchain.info web wallet account
Blockchain.info Access Blocked After Platform Software Update
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
A Blockchain.info user experienced sudden access denial to their hosted wallet following a platform software update. The incident occurred in an era when web-ba
Blockchain.info 2013–2014 Wallet Access Failure: Encrypted Files, Lost Password, Functional Recovery Phrase
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
User 'marvin42' created Bitcoin wallets via blockchain.info in 2013 or 2014 and retained two AES-encrypted backup files dated 28 February 2014 and 22 April 2013
Bitomat.pl Exchange Loses 17,000 BTC to AWS Instance Restart
Exchange custody
Constrained 2011
Bitomat.pl operated as the third-largest Bitcoin exchange globally and the largest in Poland during the early 2011 cryptocurrency market. On July 26, 2011, the
50btc Pool Mining Loss: 2–3 BTC Trapped in Defunct Pool, Virtual Disk Recovery Failed
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2010
In 2010, a user identified as Zagal downloaded and ran 50miner, a mining client for the 50btc pool, on his personal computer for approximately one week. During
Unverified WIF Key Found After Brother's Death; Blockchain.com Wallet Remains Inaccessible
Exchange custody
Indeterminate
A man had invested shared family funds in a Bitcoin wallet on blockchain.com approximately 10 years before his death. He left no recovery instructions, seed phr
BitGo Wallet Permanently Inaccessible: Lost 2FA Device and Missing Documentation
Exchange custody
Blocked
A long-term Bitcoin holder maintained a BitGo-hosted wallet from 2015 without establishing comprehensive backup procedures or written documentation. The account
Blockchain.info Account Locked After 2FA Device Loss—Recovery Process Failed
Exchange custody
Blocked
A Blockchain.info user lost access to their two-factor authentication device (Google Authenticator) and could no longer log into their account. Blockchain.info'
BitGo Account Lockout: Forgotten Password, Inaccessible Recovery Email, Circular Dependency
Exchange custody
Blocked
A BitGo user faced complete account lockout after simultaneously losing access to two critical elements: the login password and the email address registered to
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Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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