CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
ConstrainedVendor lockout

Constrained — Vendor lockout

Cases where exchange or custodial Bitcoin was eventually accessed, but only through significant effort — bankruptcy claims processes, legal proceedings, identity re-verification, or extended support escalation. Constrained outcomes are the most common positive result in exchange custody failures.

36% of all vendor-lockout cases in the archive result in a constrained outcome. These 51 cases represent the full 36% — the subset where this specific combination of stress condition and outcome is documented. The most common recovery path is exchange support.

0
Blocked
51
Constrained
0
Survived
0
Indeterminate

100% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

51 observed cases
Constrained
51 (100%)
Blockchain.info 2FA Email Delivery Failure — December 2017 Access Lock
Exchange custody
Constrained 2017
In early December 2017, the user crando discovered they could not access their Blockchain.info hosted wallet after the platform failed to deliver two-factor aut
Cryptsy Exchange: 13,000 BTC Theft Concealed, Ponzi Operations, Founder Flight (2014–2016)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
Cryptsy, a Florida-based cryptocurrency exchange operated by Paul Vernon (online alias 'Big Vern'), suffered a critical security breach in July 2014 when attack
Cryptsy Exchange Insolvency: 2014 Hack Concealed Until 2015 Withdrawal Freeze
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Cryptsy, a Florida-registered multi-currency exchange founded in 2013, suffered a significant security breach in 2014 that compromised user Bitcoin and altcoin
Vault of Satoshi Exchange Closure: Institutional Custody Dependency and Forced Withdrawal Deadline
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Vault of Satoshi, a Canadian cryptocurrency exchange launched in October 2013, announced permanent closure effective February 5, 2015. The platform had differen
Institutional lockout — exchange custody, Australia (2015)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
igot, an Australian Bitcoin exchange operated by Remi Fabre under the digital.cc domain, entered a state of operational dysfunction beginning in August 2015. Us
Kraken Exchange DDoS Attack — Users Locked Out During November 2015 Extortion Siege
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Kraken, a US-registered cryptocurrency exchange founded in 2011, received an extortion letter in November 2015 demanding Bitcoin payment in exchange for cancell
Institutional lockout — exchange custody, Australia (2015)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
In August 2015, the Australian Bitcoin exchange igot ceased all operations and communications, leaving customers unable to access their holdings or funds. Reddi
Bitstamp Exchange Hack — 19,000 BTC Stolen via Employee Phishing, January 2015
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
On January 4, 2015, Bitstamp discovered that operational hot wallets held approximately 19,000 BTC had been compromised. The Luxembourg-based exchange, a primar
Bitfinex May 2015 Hot Wallet Breach: 1,400 BTC Stolen, Trading Suspended
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Bitfinex, a major cryptocurrency exchange operating under Hong Kong incorporation and British Virgin Islands registration, suffered a security breach in May 201
CAVIRTEX Closure and Withdrawal Delays: February–March 2015
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
CAVIRTEX, a Canadian Bitcoin exchange, announced its closure on February 17, 2015, following discovery of a database compromise involving older user information
MtGox Civil Rehabilitation Claims Process: Password Reset Barrier
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Following the MtGox collapse, Japan's civil rehabilitation framework opened a formal claims process to distribute recovered assets to affected users. However, a
Blockchain.info Two-Factor Authentication Reset Declined — November 2014
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
On November 15, 2014, a Blockchain.info user enabled two-factor authentication using Google Authenticator on an Android phone but failed to back up the QR code
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 BTC Lost, 127,000 Creditors Locked Out
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the dominant Bitcoin exchange in early 2014, processing over 70% of global Bitcoin transactions. On February 7, 2014, the platform abruptly
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 BTC Lost, 127,000 Creditors, 10-Year Recovery
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the world's primary Bitcoin exchange from 2006 onward, handling over 70% of global Bitcoin transaction volume at its peak. The platform func
Mt. Gox Withdrawal Crisis: levino's 347-Page Thread Documents SEPA Delays (April 2013)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
On April 18, 2013, BitcoinTalk user levino initiated a withdrawal of Euro proceeds from Mt. Gox, the world's largest Bitcoin exchange at that time. After 14 day
Bitfloor Exchange Closure March 2013: Banking Relationship Failure After Prior Hack
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
Bitfloor, a US-based Bitcoin exchange, announced permanent closure on March 17, 2013, after its banking partner terminated the exchange's account without explan
Instawallet Hosted Wallet Shutdown After 2013 Security Breach: Partial User Reimbursement
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
Instawallet, operated by French company Paymain (later Paymium), provided frictionless Bitcoin access during the early ecosystem's rapid expansion. The service
Inputs.io Hack: 4,100 BTC Stolen, Partial Refunds October 2013
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
Inputs.io was an Australian-hosted Bitcoin wallet service operated by a developer known as TradeFortress. On October 23, 2013, the platform suffered a security
Blockchain.info Access Blocked After Platform Software Update
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
A Blockchain.info user experienced sudden access denial to their hosted wallet following a platform software update. The incident occurred in an era when web-ba
Bitcoinica Receivership: 98,000 BTC Lost Across Three Thefts and MtGox Collapse
Exchange custody
Constrained 2012
Bitcoinica, a Bitcoin margin trading platform incorporated as a New Zealand limited partnership and launched by Zhou Tong in September 2011, suffered a cascade
Tradehill Exchange Shutdown: Users Locked Out After Dwolla Payment Reversal
Exchange custody
Constrained 2012
Tradehill operated as one of Bitcoin's earliest and most prominent exchanges, second only to Mt. Gox in trading volume and user trust. On February 13, 2012, the
Bitomat.pl Exchange Loses 17,000 BTC to AWS Instance Restart
Exchange custody
Constrained 2011
Bitomat.pl operated as the third-largest Bitcoin exchange globally and the largest in Poland during the early 2011 cryptocurrency market. On July 26, 2011, the
GreenAddress User Locked Out by 2FA Requirement Despite Mnemonic Backup
Collaborative custody
Constrained
A GreenAddress user transferred Bitcoin from Bitfinex to a GreenAddress multisig wallet, securing an encrypted backup of their recovery mnemonics using their Br
BTC-e Exchange Shutdown: Partial Recovery from Mining Pool Collapse
Software wallet
Constrained
BTC-e, a major cryptocurrency exchange operating since 2011, was shut down by law enforcement in July 2017. The platform held significant user deposits, includi
LUNO Exchange Account Access Failure: Email Identifier Lockout
Exchange custody
Constrained
In 2013, a Bitcoin holder received cryptocurrency from BitX (later rebranded as LUNO) and deposited the funds directly on the exchange platform. For several yea
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Related pages
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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