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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Passphrase DependencySurvives

Passphrase Dependency — Survived

Cases where passphrase dependency existed but access was recovered. Successful bruteforce, located documentation, or partial recall enabled recovery.

46 cases in this intersection. 0% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome and 100% in access survived. The most common recovery path is password bruteforce.

0
Blocked
0
Constrained
46
Survived
0
Indeterminate

0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

46 observed cases
Survived
46 (100%)
Recovery of Dormant Blockchain.info Wallet via Legacy 20-Word Mnemonic (2017)
Exchange custody
Survived 2014
Roland808, a BitcoinTalk user, discovered a text file on their computer in March 2017 dated from 2014 containing a label 'bitcoin nmemonic' followed by 20 rando
22.1 BTC Bitcoin-Qt Wallet Password Recovery via Community Brute Force (2014)
Software wallet
Survived 2014
In November 2014, a Bitcoin-Qt wallet containing 22.1 BTC became inaccessible when its owner forgot the passphrase. The owner had documented the password creati
Electrum Wallet Recovery After Seed Backup Loss: electrum.dat File Decryption
Software wallet
Survived 2014
In April 2014, a BitcoinTalk forum user (DarkHyudrA) experienced custody access failure after formatting their personal computer without preserving a backup cop
43.6 BTC Recovered via RoboForm RNG Reverse-Engineering After TrueCrypt Corruption
Software wallet
Survived 2013
Michael, a European Bitcoin holder, generated and secured a 20-character password using RoboForm in April 2013 and transferred 43.6 BTC into a software wallet.
Encrypted wallet.dat passphrase mismatch: offline wallet creation to recovery (2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In July 2013, a user created an encrypted wallet on an Ubuntu live CD and stored the wallet.dat file offline. Several months later, in December 2013, he importe
Kristoffer Koch Recovers Forgotten 5,000 BTC Wallet After Four Years
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2009, Kristoffer Koch, a Norwegian engineering student, purchased 5,000 Bitcoin for approximately 150 Norwegian kroner (roughly $27 USD at the time) as resea
Forgotten Passphrase Locks Desktop Wallet for 8 Years; btcrecover Enables Recovery
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2013, this individual created a Bitcoin wallet using desktop software, securing it with a passphrase. The holder subsequently lost memory of that passphrase
Blockchain.info Hosted Wallet Recovery: Password Reset via Seed Phrase (2013)
Exchange custody
Survived 2013
PandaNL opened a Blockchain.info hosted wallet in 2013 and over several years forgot the account password. The user retained three critical pieces of recovery i
BitcoinTalk User kentt Recovers Encrypted Wallet via Community Brute-Force Script (June 2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In June 2013, BitcoinTalk user kentt posted confirmation of a successful wallet recovery using community-developed brute-force scripts circulated in topic 85495
Norwegian Student Successfully Recovered Forgotten Bitcoin Wallet Password From 2009
Software wallet
Survived 2009
In 2009, a Norwegian student purchased approximately $27 worth of Bitcoin as part of an academic exploration of the emerging cryptocurrency. The purchase and wa
Kristoffer Koch Recovers 5000 BTC After Forgotten Wallet Password — 2013
Software wallet
Survived 2009
Kristoffer Koch, a Norwegian engineering student, encountered Bitcoin in late 2009 while researching encryption for his university thesis. Intrigued by the emer
Forgotten Bitcoin Wallet Passphrases: Forum Cases of Successful Third-Party Recovery (2014–2021)
Software wallet
Survived
Between 2014 and 2021, seven Bitcoin holders posted testimonials on a forum documenting their recovery of wallets encrypted with forgotten passphrases. Cases ra
Recovering a Deceased Father's 14 BTC from Blockchain.com via Email Access
Exchange custody
Survived
A Reddit user reported successfully recovering 14 BTC held in a Blockchain.com wallet belonging to their deceased father approximately six months after the deat
Passphrase Recovery Success and OPSEC Failure: 2014 WalletRecoveryServices Case
Software wallet
Survived
A Bitcoin holder in 2014 created private keys but lost the passphrase required to access them. The funds remained locked for an unknown duration until the owner
BIP38 Paper Wallet: Seven-Year Inaccessibility Resolved via Single-Character Error
Software wallet
Survived
In 2017, an individual encrypted a paper wallet using BIP38 encryption, protecting it with a passphrase derived from their favorite band—a mnemonic they believe
4 BTC Lost Behind Forgotten Passphrase After Ledger PIN Lockout
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Survived
The user maintained a Ledger Nano S hardware wallet configured with two separate accounts: a primary account secured by a 24-word BIP39 seed phrase stored in co
IronKey Password Recovery: Developer Regains Access to $240M Bitcoin
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Survived
In the early 2010s, a software developer stored Bitcoin on an IronKey encrypted USB drive, securing it with a passphrase generated by RoboForm password manager.
Seven-Year Bitcoin Wallet Lockout: Passphrase Typo and Recovery Without Backup
Software wallet
Survived
A Bitcoin holder lost access to a self-custodied wallet for seven years after entering an incorrect passphrase derivative. The error locked the private key behi
170 BTC Passphrase Lockout: Year-Long Inaccessibility Resolved by Memory Recovery
Software wallet
Survived
In early 2011, an investor acquired approximately 170 BTC at roughly $10 per coin, storing the funds in Bitcoin-Qt, the primary self-custody software wallet ava
Major Bitcoin Holder Recovers 58,915 BTC After 7-Year Access Loss
Software wallet
Survived
A Bitcoin holder with substantial holdings lost access to their wallet containing 58,915 BTC approximately 7 years prior to recovery. The loss was caused by a s
MultiBit 5.1 Password Authentication Failure After Windows 10 System Update
Software wallet
Survived
A MultiBit 5.1 user experienced catastrophic access failure following a Windows 10 system update. The wallet software subsequently rejected the user's correct p
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Browse by dependency and outcome
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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