CustodyStress
ArchiveAuthority–Access Gap › Vendor Lockout
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Authority–Access Gap — Vendor Lockout

Cases where a party held legal authority over the Bitcoin — as owner, heir, or executor — but lacked the operational access required to exercise it. This page shows archive cases where both conditions were present.

Browse all archive sections — situations, patterns, dependencies, events →
41 observed cases

Outcome distributions are available in archive statistics.

ThrillHou v. Cryptsy: Account Lockout, KYC Data Misuse, and Alleged Identity Compromise
Exchange custody
Blocked 2015
ThrillHou, a Cryptsy user, experienced repeated account lockouts beginning in 2015. When support staff operating under aliases BigJohn and John McPherson repeat
Cryptsy Freezes 175 BTC: Ukrainian User Blocked by KYC During Armed Conflict
Exchange custody
Blocked 2015
In 2015, a Reddit user known as alkinsonf held 175 Bitcoin on the popular exchange Cryptsy following an active trading period with no apparent issues. Without w
MtGox Civil Rehabilitation Claims Process: Password Reset Barrier
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Following the MtGox collapse, Japan's civil rehabilitation framework opened a formal claims process to distribute recovered assets to affected users. However, a
BitInstant Exchange Collapse: Charlie Shrem Arrest Freezes Customer Funds
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
BitInstant operated as one of the earliest and most prominent custodial Bitcoin exchanges in the United States, co-founded by Charlie Shrem with backing from th
Vircurex Exchange Freezes Customer Bitcoin Indefinitely After 2013 Hacks
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Vircurex, an altcoin exchange operating during the early cryptocurrency era, halted all withdrawals in March 2014 after suffering two significant security breac
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 BTC Lost, 127,000 Creditors, 10-Year Recovery
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the world's primary Bitcoin exchange from 2006 onward, handling over 70% of global Bitcoin transaction volume at its peak. The platform func
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: Operator Theft and 650,000 Lost Customer Bitcoin
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the dominant Bitcoin-to-fiat exchange from 2010 to 2014, handling approximately 70% of global Bitcoin trading volume at its peak. The platfo
Intersango Exchange Collapse: 2000 BTC User Funds Retained by Operator — Norman v. Strateman
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
Intersango, a UK-based Bitcoin exchange co-founded by Amir Taaki and Patrick Strateman, ceased operations in 2012 after losing its banking relationship. At the
BitMarket.eu: Operator Speculation and Bitcoinica Collapse Froze 18,787 BTC in Customer Funds
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
BitMarket.eu launched in April 2011 as a Polish peer-to-peer Bitcoin exchange. The platform operator, Maciej Trębacz, made a critical decision to invest custome
Bitcoinica Receivership: 98,000 BTC Lost Across Three Thefts and MtGox Collapse
Exchange custody
Constrained 2012
Bitcoinica, a Bitcoin margin trading platform incorporated as a New Zealand limited partnership and launched by Zhou Tong in September 2011, suffered a cascade
Bitomat.pl Exchange Loses 17,000 BTC to AWS Instance Restart
Exchange custody
Constrained 2011
Bitomat.pl operated as the third-largest Bitcoin exchange globally and the largest in Poland during the early 2011 cryptocurrency market. On July 26, 2011, the
Bitstamp Withdrawal Blocked: Impossible KYC Demand for Historical Coin Provenance
Exchange custody
Blocked
A user with an established, verified Bitstamp account took a multi-year break from trading. In 2013, the user purchased $2,500 worth of Bitcoin on an alternativ
Blockchain.com Account Lockup: 8-Month Custody Freeze Despite Verified Funds
Exchange custody
Blocked
In summer 2022, an individual opened a hosted wallet account on Blockchain.com and completed full KYC verification, achieving the platform's highest transaction
Blockchain.com Account De-Verification: Funds Inaccessible, No Communication or Recovery Path
Exchange custody
Blocked
A user with an active Blockchain.com account maintained since 2017 experienced sudden account de-verification, rendering all funds held in the platform's reward
Kraken Account Lockout: Cryptographic Proof of Ownership Rejected
Exchange custody
Blocked
In September 2020, Kraken implemented device confirmation security requiring verification codes sent to registered email addresses. A user with Bitcoin holdings
MtGox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 Bitcoin Custody Failure
Exchange custody
Blocked
Mt. Gox, founded in 2006 and operating as a Bitcoin exchange from 2010, accumulated custody of approximately 850,000 Bitcoin belonging to its users by early 201
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Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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