CustodyStress
Archive › Year and outcome › 2015 — Constrained
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
2015Constrained

2015 — Constrained

Bitcoin custody cases from 2015 with a constrained outcome. 10 cases in the archive where the incident occurred in 2015 and the documented outcome was constrained.

Archive analysis — 10 cases
Outcomes
0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 69 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. Only 0% resulted in recovered access — one of the lower survival rates in the archive. 100% resulted in constrained recovery.
Custody type
90% of cases involved exchange custody, followed by software wallet at 10%.
Primary stress condition
80% of cases involve vendor lockout. Legal or authority constraint accounts for a further 10%.
Recovery path
Exchange Support is the most documented recovery path (7 cases, 70% of subset). Of those with a determinate outcome, 100% resulted in recovered or constrained access.
Documentation
90% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Structural dependency
90% of cases carry a institutional cooperation required dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
0
Blocked
10
Constrained
0
Survived
0
Indeterminate

100% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

10 observed cases
Constrained
10 (100%)
Cryptsy Exchange Insolvency: 2014 Hack Concealed Until 2015 Withdrawal Freeze
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Cryptsy, a Florida-registered multi-currency exchange founded in 2013, suffered a significant security breach in 2014 that compromised user Bitcoin and altcoin
Vault of Satoshi Exchange Closure: Institutional Custody Dependency and Forced Withdrawal Deadline
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Vault of Satoshi, a Canadian cryptocurrency exchange launched in October 2013, announced permanent closure effective February 5, 2015. The platform had differen
Institutional lockout — exchange custody, Australia (2015)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
igot, an Australian Bitcoin exchange operated by Remi Fabre under the digital.cc domain, entered a state of operational dysfunction beginning in August 2015. Us
Kraken Exchange DDoS Attack — Users Locked Out During November 2015 Extortion Siege
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Kraken, a US-registered cryptocurrency exchange founded in 2011, received an extortion letter in November 2015 demanding Bitcoin payment in exchange for cancell
Institutional lockout — exchange custody, Australia (2015)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
In August 2015, the Australian Bitcoin exchange igot ceased all operations and communications, leaving customers unable to access their holdings or funds. Reddi
Bitstamp Exchange Hack — 19,000 BTC Stolen via Employee Phishing, January 2015
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
On January 4, 2015, Bitstamp discovered that operational hot wallets held approximately 19,000 BTC had been compromised. The Luxembourg-based exchange, a primar
OKCoin Halts US Customer Access (August 2015): Regulatory Exclusion
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
OKCoin, then a top-ten Bitcoin exchange by trading volume, announced on August 31, 2015 that it would cease accepting USD deposits from American users and prohi
Bitfinex May 2015 Hot Wallet Breach: 1,400 BTC Stolen, Trading Suspended
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
Bitfinex, a major cryptocurrency exchange operating under Hong Kong incorporation and British Virgin Islands registration, suffered a security breach in May 201
Forgotten Bitcoin Core Passphrase: Third-Party Recovery Service Success — Community Skepticism
Software wallet
Constrained 2015
In July 2015, a BitcoinTalk user (bassride2) discovered that while they had meticulously backed up their Bitcoin Core wallet.dat file multiple times, they had f
CAVIRTEX Closure and Withdrawal Delays: February–March 2015
Exchange custody
Constrained 2015
CAVIRTEX, a Canadian Bitcoin exchange, announced its closure on February 17, 2015, following discovery of a database compromise involving older user information
Year and outcome
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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