Archive › Year and outcome › 2013 — Constrained
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
2013 — Constrained
Bitcoin custody cases from 2013 with a constrained outcome. 6 cases in the archive where the incident occurred in 2013 and the documented outcome was constrained.
Archive analysis — 6 cases
Outcomes
0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 69 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. 100% resulted in constrained recovery.
Custody type
83% of cases involved exchange custody, followed by software wallet at 17%.
Primary stress condition
83% of cases involve vendor lockout. Passphrase unavailable accounts for a further 17%.
Recovery path
Exchange Support is the most documented recovery path (3 cases, 50% of subset).
Structural dependency
83% of cases carry a shared service dependency dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
6 observed cases
Mt. Gox Withdrawal Crisis: levino's 347-Page Thread Documents SEPA Delays (April 2013)
Exchange custody
Constrained
2013
On April 18, 2013, BitcoinTalk user levino initiated a withdrawal of Euro proceeds from Mt. Gox, the world's largest Bitcoin exchange at that time. After 14 day
Bitfloor Exchange Closure March 2013: Banking Relationship Failure After Prior Hack
Exchange custody
Constrained
2013
Bitfloor, a US-based Bitcoin exchange, announced permanent closure on March 17, 2013, after its banking partner terminated the exchange's account without explan
Instawallet Hosted Wallet Shutdown After 2013 Security Breach: Partial User Reimbursement
Exchange custody
Constrained
2013
Instawallet, operated by French company Paymain (later Paymium), provided frictionless Bitcoin access during the early ecosystem's rapid expansion. The service
Noitev's Lost Electrum Password: 1.8–1.9 BTC Recovered via Brute-Force Attack
Software wallet
Constrained
2013
On April 8, 2013, BitcoinTalk user Noitev reported losing access to an Electrum wallet holding approximately 1.8–1.9 BTC due to a forgotten password. The wallet
Inputs.io Hack: 4,100 BTC Stolen, Partial Refunds October 2013
Exchange custody
Constrained
2013
Inputs.io was an Australian-hosted Bitcoin wallet service operated by a developer known as TradeFortress. On October 23, 2013, the platform suffered a security
Blockchain.info Access Blocked After Platform Software Update
Exchange custody
Constrained
2013
A Blockchain.info user experienced sudden access denial to their hosted wallet following a platform software update. The incident occurred in an era when web-ba
Outcome terms
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Assessment terms
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?
Inclusion requirements
A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:
- Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
- Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
- Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
In scope
- Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
- Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
- Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
- Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
- Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
- Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
- Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
- Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
- Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
- Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
- Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
- Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
Out of scope
- Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
- Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
- Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
- Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
- Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
- Deliberate burns or tribute burns
- Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described
Source and verification
Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.
The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.