CustodyStress
Archive › Bitcoin scale › Very Large (100+ BTC)
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Very Large (100+ BTC)

Cases involving 100 or more BTC at the time of the custody failure.

Cases involving 100 BTC or more show a 51% coercion rate — the highest of any scale category. Large holdings attract targeted physical coercion at a substantially higher rate than small or medium holdings, and 65% of determinate cases in this category resulted in a blocked outcome.

24
Blocked
5
Constrained
8
Survived
10
Indeterminate

78% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

47 observed cases
Blocked
24 (51%)
Constrained
5 (11%)
Survived
8 (17%)
Indeterminate
10 (21%)
Voyager Digital Freeze: 3.5M Users, $650M Loan Default, Chapter 11
Exchange custody
Constrained 2022
Voyager Digital, a cryptocurrency broker serving over 3.5 million active users, suspended all trading and withdrawals on July 1, 2022. The collapse followed a $
Vinay Naik Kidnapped in Pune for $50M Bitcoin Ransom
Unknown custody system
Indeterminate 2022
Vinay Naik was kidnapped in February 2022 in Pune, India, by an organized group of eight individuals, including at least one officer from local law enforcement.
BlockFi Chapter 11: 100,000+ Creditors, $355M Crypto Frozen After FTX Collapse
Exchange custody
Constrained 2022
BlockFi, a centralized lending platform that accepted customer deposits of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, announced a withdrawal halt on November 10, 2022,
Zaryn Dentzel Home Invasion: Torture and Forced Bitcoin Transfer in Madrid
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2021
Zaryn Dentzel, an American co-founder of Tuenti (a major Spanish social network), became the victim of a violent home invasion in Madrid in November 2021. Attac
Omsk Kidnapping and Extortion: $1M+ Cryptocurrency Seized Under Duress
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2021
In July 2021, three men in Omsk, Russia abducted a victim and held them under physical duress to extort cryptocurrency holdings exceeding $1 million. The perpet
2,000 BTC Lost in Atomic Wallet: Recovery Phrase Gone After OS Reinstall
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2020
In September 2020, a BitcoinTalk user posted a custody access failure involving approximately 2,000 BTC held in an Atomic wallet. The user had lost their 12-wor
QuadrigaCX Gerald Cotten Death: C$190M in Cold Storage Permanently Inaccessible
Exchange custody
Blocked 2018
Gerald Cotten, 30, founded and operated QuadrigaCX as Canada's largest cryptocurrency exchange. He managed the platform's operations, customer support, and crit
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 BTC Lost, 127,000 Creditors, 10-Year Recovery
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the world's primary Bitcoin exchange from 2006 onward, handling over 70% of global Bitcoin transaction volume at its peak. The platform func
James Howell's Hard Drive: 8,000 Bitcoin Lost in Welsh Landfill
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2014
James Howell, a British-based individual, accidentally discarded a hard drive containing private keys to approximately 8,000 Bitcoin while cleaning his office a
James Howell's 8,000 Bitcoin Hard Drive: Landfill Loss Without Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
James Howell, a computer professional based in Wales, accumulated approximately 8,000 Bitcoin during the early mining era through a combination of mining and ac
Kristoffer Koch Recovers Forgotten 5,000 BTC Wallet After Four Years
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2009, Kristoffer Koch, a Norwegian engineering student, purchased 5,000 Bitcoin for approximately 150 Norwegian kroner (roughly $27 USD at the time) as resea
Intersango Exchange Collapse: 2000 BTC User Funds Retained by Operator — Norman v. Strateman
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
Intersango, a UK-based Bitcoin exchange co-founded by Amir Taaki and Patrick Strateman, ceased operations in 2012 after losing its banking relationship. At the
Anonymous Reddit User: 7,500 BTC Inaccessible Due to Forgotten Wallet Password
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
An anonymous Reddit user posted in 2014 about a significant custody failure: he had purchased approximately 7,500 Bitcoin in 2012 and stored them in an encrypte
Stefan Thomas and 7,002 Bitcoin: Locked Behind a Forgotten Passphrase
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2011
Stefan Thomas held 7,002 Bitcoin stored on an encrypted hard drive containing the private keys. Access to the device required a passphrase that Thomas had forgo
MyBitcoin.com Custody Collapse (July 2011): 78,747 BTC Lost, Partial Refund, Operator Never Identified
Exchange custody
Blocked 2011
MyBitcoin.com, launched in 2010, became one of the first popular custodial Bitcoin web wallet services at a time when hardware wallets did not exist and self-cu
10,000 Bitcoin Lost When Laptop Discarded as Junk (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In March or April 2010, while a final-year student at St. John's University in New York, an individual purchased 10,000 BTC from a local seller for approximatel
3,000 BTC Locked on Discontinued Blockchain.com Wallet: Missing Email Address Blocks Recovery
Exchange custody
Blocked 2009
Ice22 acquired 3,000 BTC in June 2009 through an intermediary claiming to represent a Swiss or Swedish Bitcoin promotion entity. The acquisition process include
Kristoffer Koch Recovers 5000 BTC After Forgotten Wallet Password — 2013
Software wallet
Survived 2009
Kristoffer Koch, a Norwegian engineering student, encountered Bitcoin in late 2009 while researching encryption for his university thesis. Intrigued by the emer
7500 BTC Permanently Locked on IronKey Device After Passphrase Loss
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Blocked
A British engineer encrypted approximately 7500 BTC on an IronKey device, a third-party encrypted storage solution designed with progressive lockout mechanisms
Stefan Thomas and the IronKey Trap: 7,002 Bitcoin, 2 Attempts Left
Hardware wallet (single key)
Indeterminate
Stefan Thomas, a programmer, received 7,002 BTC in 2011 as payment for creating an animated educational video about Bitcoin. He stored the private keys on an Ir
James Howells: 7,500 Bitcoin Lost to Landfill Disposal Without Backup
Software wallet
Blocked
James Howells stored the private keys to 7,500 Bitcoin on a standard 2.5-inch laptop hard drive, which he placed in a drawer. After several years, the drive was
3000 BTC Mined on Pentium 3: Multiple Reformatted Drives, Wallet Location Unknown
Software wallet
Indeterminate
During Bitcoin's early years, this user established mining operations on a Pentium 3 computer and accumulated approximately 3000 BTC before ceasing work as netw
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Bitcoin scale
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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