CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Cycle 2Device loss

Halving Cycle 2 (2013–2016) — Device loss

Bitcoin custody cases involving halving cycle 2 (2013–2016) and device loss.

20 cases in this intersection. 69% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome and 31% in access survived. The most common recovery path is technical recovery.

Archive analysis — 20 cases
Outcomes
69% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access, close to the archive-wide average of 69%. 31% resulted in recovered access — above the archive average.
Documentation coverage
35% of cases have indeterminate outcomes — higher than the archive average of 43%.
Custody type
95% of cases involved software wallet, followed by hardware wallet (single key) at 5%.
Recovery path
Technical Recovery is the most documented recovery path (6 cases, 30% of subset).
Documentation
55% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Scale
15% of cases involved large or very large holdings (10+ BTC).
9
Blocked
0
Constrained
4
Survived
7
Indeterminate

69% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

20 observed cases
Blocked
9 (45%)
Survived
4 (20%)
Indeterminate
7 (35%)
1,000+ BTC Permanently Lost: Multiple Hard Drive Formats Destroyed Wallet Data
Software wallet
Blocked 2016
In 2009, a teenager claiming to be an early Bitcoin adopter received over 1,000 BTC allegedly directly from Satoshi Nakamoto. The user stored the wallet on a de
Smartphone Wallet Reset Without Backup: 15 BTC Private Key Unverified
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In November 2016, a user identified as 'Farer' created a Bitcoin wallet on a smartphone and accumulated 15 bitcoins. Approximately one year later, the user rese
Corrupted Encrypted wallet.dat Recovered via Partition-Level Recovery
Software wallet
Survived 2016
In March 2016, a Bitcoin Core user discovered their only backup of an encrypted wallet.dat file had become corrupted, likely due to improper shutdown of Bitcoin
Deleted Encrypted Wallet Without Backup: Private Keys Lost
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2016
In November 2016, a Bitcoin Stack Exchange user posted about deleting their wallet file during a computer wipe, having never created a backup. The user had conv
Recovering Deleted Bitcoin Core wallet.dat via pywallet: Device Loss and Forensic Key Extraction
Software wallet
Survived 2015
Edgar's Bitcoin Core wallet became inaccessible in 2015 when the wallet.dat file was removed from the active system while the Bitcoin Core client remained open.
Forgotten Bitcoin Wallet on Lost Amazon Fire Phone: Data Recovery Failure
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2015
In 2015, a friend transferred approximately $10 worth of Bitcoin to a user's Amazon Fire phone using a mobile wallet application as payment for donuts. The user
Hard Drive Format Recovery: 2 BTC Restored via Sector Scanning and wallet.dat Reconstruction
Software wallet
Survived 2015
In approximately 2015, marilyn4325 formatted a hard drive and installed Windows 10, intending to preserve wallet data via backup first. However, the backup beca
MultiBit Wallet on Stolen Laptop: Recovery Phrase Format Ambiguity Blocks Access
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2014
In 2014, mcsteely purchased Bitcoin from a Bitcoin ATM and sent it to a MultiBit wallet installed on a laptop. The device was subsequently stolen. At the time,
20 Bitcoin Wallets Lost to Hard Drive Failure—Manual Recovery via Data Forensics and Private Key Extraction
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2014
In August 2014, Lucky Cris experienced simultaneous hardware failure affecting both primary and external backup drives, rendering all Bitcoin holdings inaccessi
Windows System Refresh and Data Recovery Failure: Bitcoin Permanently Inaccessible
Software wallet
Blocked 2014
In 2014, sachalamp's Windows 7 or 8 computer experienced a system failure. The user performed a Windows refresh operation, which reset Bitcoin Core and severed
James Howell's Hard Drive: 8,000 Bitcoin Lost in Welsh Landfill
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2014
James Howell, a British-based individual, accidentally discarded a hard drive containing private keys to approximately 8,000 Bitcoin while cleaning his office a
Encrypted Wallet Recovery After Accidental Partition Deletion (2013)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
On July 17, 2013, a Bitcoin holder identified as Praxis posted to a cryptocurrency forum after losing access to multiple wallet files stored in hidden Linux dir
Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0-beta Wallet Corruption on OS X Mountain Lion — Unrecovered After Five Months
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In late April 2013, jordan.dev, a Bitcoin-Qt user on macOS Mountain Lion 10.8.3, encountered a crash (EXC_BAD_ACCESS/SIGBUS) when launching Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0-bet
James Howell's 8,000 Bitcoin Hard Drive: Landfill Loss Without Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
James Howell, a computer professional based in Wales, accumulated approximately 8,000 Bitcoin during the early mining era through a combination of mining and ac
Wallet.dat Recovery Failure After Premature Bitcoin-Qt Reinstall
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In mid-2013, a Bitcoin user operating under the handle spoonbender encountered a custody access failure rooted in device loss and procedural error during recove
James Howells and the Landfill Bitcoin: Device Lost, Recovery Legally Blocked
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
James Howells, a UK resident, discarded a hard drive containing an encrypted Bitcoin wallet during a routine office clearance in 2013. The device was disposed o
Australian Miner Loses Early Bitcoin When Sole USB Backup Drive Fails Irrecoverably
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
Alex, an Australian Bitcoin miner based in Melbourne, mined Bitcoin around 2010 when mining was still a hobbyist activity with negligible monetary value. Unlike
Bitcoin Core wallet.dat Berkeley DB Corruption (2013–2024): Cross-Platform Recovery
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
A Bitcoin user who created a wallet backup in 2014 using Bitcoin Core version 2013 attempted to restore it in March 2024 on a Windows machine running Bitcoin Co
Encrypted wallet.dat Corruption: Recovery Attempt After Unplanned Reformat
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In November 2013, a Bitcoin holder discovered they had deleted their wallet.dat file during a Windows system reformat without maintaining a backup. Realizing th
Multibit Wallet Recovered From Formatted Hard Drive After 5 Years
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2013, a Bitcoin holder stored funds in a Multibit wallet on a work desktop computer. The hard drive was subsequently formatted, and the user assumed the Bitc
Browse by halving cycle and stress
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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