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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Exchange EraExchange custody

Exchange Era (2014–2019) — Exchange custody

Exchange custody failures from the Exchange Era (2014–2019). This is the dominant combination in the archive — the period when exchange custody became the primary access model and produced the largest volume of institutional failures.

139 cases from this period are included in this archive. Exchange and custodial custody failures account for 100% of cases. 60% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome.

61
Blocked
34
Constrained
6
Survived
38
Indeterminate

94% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

139 observed cases
Blocked
61 (44%)
Constrained
34 (24%)
Survived
6 (4%)
Indeterminate
38 (27%)
Vircurex Exchange Freezes Customer Bitcoin Indefinitely After 2013 Hacks
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Vircurex, an altcoin exchange operating during the early cryptocurrency era, halted all withdrawals in March 2014 after suffering two significant security breac
Picostocks Bitcoin Exchange: 7,196 BTC Lost to Insider Theft (2013–2014)
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Picostocks was a custodial Bitcoin exchange that allowed users to hold Bitcoin-denominated shares in various projects. The platform suffered two major theft inc
Mt. Gox Collapse Overshadows Father's Estate: Unrecover­able Bitcoin Loss
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Around 2012, a Reddit user posted in a Mt. Gox horror story thread describing a custody failure layered with family loss. His father had died approximately one
Forgotten Password on Blockchain.info Web Wallet: 0.22 BTC Inaccessible
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2014
In October 2014, a Bitcoin Forum user (findftp) sought technical assistance for a friend who had lost access to a Blockchain.info wallet containing 0.22 BTC (ap
Forgotten Blockchain.info Password: 0.22 BTC Recovery Attempt via Brute-Force
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2014
In October 2014, a BitcoinTalk forum user (findftp) posted on behalf of a friend who had lost the password to a Blockchain.info web wallet containing 0.22 BTC (
Blockchain.com 2014 Hosted Wallet: Password and Seed Phrase Loss
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2014
A Blockchain.com customer acquired approximately 0.5 BTC in 2014 using the platform's hosted wallet service. Over the years, the original password and recovery
Flexcoin Collapse: 896 BTC Hot Wallet Theft Leaves Users Permanently Locked Out
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Flexcoin, an Alberta-based service marketed as the first Bitcoin bank, operated a custodial platform for users seeking institutional-grade storage and transfer
MtGox Withdrawal Halt and Bankruptcy: 400K Inheritance Permanently Blocked
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
In 2014, the largest Bitcoin exchange at that time, MtGox, ceased Bitcoin withdrawals and subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection. A documented case emerge
0.5 BTC Lost in Blockchain.info Encrypted Wallet (2014)
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2014
In January 2014, an early Bitcoin adopter purchased BTC on LocalBitcoins and transferred 0.5 BTC to a public address in August of that year. The user recorded o
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 BTC Lost, 127,000 Creditors, 10-Year Recovery
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the world's primary Bitcoin exchange from 2006 onward, handling over 70% of global Bitcoin transaction volume at its peak. The platform func
MintPal Exchange Bankruptcy and 3,894 BTC Theft by Ryan Kennedy
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
MintPal was an altcoin exchange that suffered a hack of 8 million Vericoin in July 2014. The exchange was subsequently acquired by Ryan Kennedy, who operated un
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: Operator Theft and 650,000 Lost Customer Bitcoin
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the dominant Bitcoin-to-fiat exchange from 2010 to 2014, handling approximately 70% of global Bitcoin trading volume at its peak. The platfo
Forgotten Password on Blockchain.info: 0.22 BTC Access Lost, Brute-Force Recovery Attempted
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2014
In October 2014, a BitcoinTalk forum user reported that their friend had become locked out of a blockchain.info wallet containing 0.22 BTC after forgetting the
FXBTC Shanghai Exchange Premature Closure Blocks Customer Withdrawals
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
FXBTC was a Shanghai-based cryptocurrency exchange operating during China's early Bitcoin trading boom. In early May 2014, following escalating regulatory press
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Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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