CustodyStress
Archive › Bitcoin eras › Early Bitcoin (2009–2013)
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Early Bitcoin (2009–2013)

Bitcoin custody failures from the network's first five years. Custody infrastructure was nonexistent — no hardware wallets, no seed phrase standards, no established backup practices. The dominant failure modes are device loss, discarded hard drives, and seeds that were never recorded. Coercion had not yet emerged as a significant pattern.

158 cases from this period are included in this archive. 73% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome. The most frequently observed stress condition is passphrase-unavailable cases.

62
Blocked
9
Constrained
14
Survived
73
Indeterminate

84% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

158 observed cases
Blocked
62 (39%)
Constrained
9 (6%)
Survived
14 (9%)
Indeterminate
73 (46%)
Dave Kleiman Estate vs. Craig Wright: 1.1 Million Bitcoin, Ownership Unresolved
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2013
Dave Kleiman, a computer forensics specialist based in Florida, was an early Bitcoin developer who died on April 26, 2013, after years of declining health follo
Inputs.io Hack: 4,100 BTC Stolen, Partial Refunds October 2013
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
Inputs.io was an Australian-hosted Bitcoin wallet service operated by a developer known as TradeFortress. On October 23, 2013, the platform suffered a security
Bitcoin Core wallet.dat Berkeley DB Corruption (2013–2024): Cross-Platform Recovery
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
A Bitcoin user who created a wallet backup in 2014 using Bitcoin Core version 2013 attempted to restore it in March 2024 on a Windows machine running Bitcoin Co
Widow Unable to Access Encrypted Bitcoin-Qt Wallet After Husband's Death
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In April 2013, a widow posted to Bitcoin Stack Exchange seeking recovery options for her deceased husband's Bitcoin-Qt wallet. The wallet was encrypted but she
Coinbase Paper Wallet Private Key Lost Before Printing—4.5 BTC Inaccessible
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In December 2013, a Bitcoin newcomer attempted to move funds to a Coinbase-hosted paper wallet generator. The user copied and pasted the private key first, but
Encrypted wallet.dat Corruption: Recovery Attempt After Unplanned Reformat
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In November 2013, a Bitcoin holder discovered they had deleted their wallet.dat file during a Windows system reformat without maintaining a backup. Realizing th
2013 Blockchain.info AES-Encrypted Wallet: Password Lost, Recovery Tooling Exhausted
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
In March 2013, during a two-month personal mining experiment, a user registered a wallet on blockchain.info and received an AES-encrypted backup file via email
2013 Bitcoin Core Wallet.dat Corruption After Version Incompatibility
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
The subject purchased a used desktop computer from a thrift store and discovered an installed Bitcoin QT client with an associated wallet.dat file dating to 201
Inherited 2009 Bitcoin Mining Hard Drive: Unrecoverable wallet.dat After OS Reinstall
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
A Bitcoin holder inherited a hard drive from their father's computer, which had been used for Bitcoin mining in November 2009. The drive had been powered down a
Blockchain.info Web Wallet (2013): Silent Login Failure, Unresolved After 3 Months
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In late 2013, a user created a Bitcoin wallet on blockchain.info, then one of the most popular web-based custodial platforms. The wallet remained accessible dur
Forgotten Passphrase Locks Desktop Wallet for 8 Years; btcrecover Enables Recovery
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2013, this individual created a Bitcoin wallet using desktop software, securing it with a passphrase. The holder subsequently lost memory of that passphrase
Blockchain.info Web Wallet: Imported Private Key Vanished After Sync Popup
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In February 2013, a BitcoinTalk user (BurtW) generated a vanity address using vanitygen and imported the private key into his Blockchain.info web wallet account
Blockchain.info Hosted Wallet Recovery: Password Reset via Seed Phrase (2013)
Exchange custody
Survived 2013
PandaNL opened a Blockchain.info hosted wallet in 2013 and over several years forgot the account password. The user retained three critical pieces of recovery i
BitcoinTalk User syuyu Locked Out of Wallet With ~32-Character Passphrase (January 2014)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In January 2014, a BitcoinTalk user known as 'syuyu' posted in an encrypted wallet recovery thread describing a locked software wallet they could no longer acce
Blockchain.info Access Blocked After Platform Software Update
Exchange custody
Constrained 2013
A Blockchain.info user experienced sudden access denial to their hosted wallet following a platform software update. The incident occurred in an era when web-ba
1990 BTC Forgotten Passphrase: Pakistani Investor's Failed Recovery Attempts (2013)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In November 2013, a BitcoinTalk forum user identified as 'Britman' disclosed a significant custody failure affecting 1990 BTC accumulated throughout 2012 at pri
Multibit Wallet Recovered From Formatted Hard Drive After 5 Years
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2013, a Bitcoin holder stored funds in a Multibit wallet on a work desktop computer. The hard drive was subsequently formatted, and the user assumed the Bitc
Blockchain.info 2013–2014 Wallet Access Failure: Encrypted Files, Lost Password, Functional Recovery Phrase
Exchange custody
Indeterminate 2013
User 'marvin42' created Bitcoin wallets via blockchain.info in 2013 or 2014 and retained two AES-encrypted backup files dated 28 February 2014 and 22 April 2013
Rahazan Develops and Shares PowerShell Wallet Recovery Script (2013)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In 2013, a BitcoinTalk user identifying as Rahazan faced a common early custody problem: an encrypted Bitcoin-Qt wallet with a forgotten passphrase. Rather than
BitcoinTalk User kentt Recovers Encrypted Wallet via Community Brute-Force Script (June 2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In June 2013, BitcoinTalk user kentt posted confirmation of a successful wallet recovery using community-developed brute-force scripts circulated in topic 85495
SP4RK7 Locked Out of Protoshares Wallet: Single-Character Password Error, Recovery Bounty Offered
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
On November 30, 2013, BitcoinTalk user SP4RK7 posted in the encrypted wallet recovery thread describing a Protoshares wallet locked with encryption that appeare
125 BTC Lost on SSD After Windows Reinstall Without Backup
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
Robert23 reported on January 5, 2012, that they had lost access to 125 BTC stored in a wallet.dat file after performing a clean Windows reinstall on an SSD driv
BitcoinTalk User ez1btc: Encryption Password Transcription Error Blocks Large Bitcoin Wallet
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
In the encrypted wallet recovery thread on BitcoinTalk, user 'ez1btc' documented a custody failure rooted in transcription error rather than forgetfulness. At t
Lost Private Key in 2012 Bitcoin Core Wallet: 5 mBTC Unspendable
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Gemwolf installed Bitcoin Core 0.6.3 in 2012, performed brief mining activity, and abandoned the wallet after one day. In November 2022, while searching old sto
Intersango Exchange Collapse: 2000 BTC User Funds Retained by Operator — Norman v. Strateman
Exchange custody
Blocked 2012
Intersango, a UK-based Bitcoin exchange co-founded by Amir Taaki and Patrick Strateman, ceased operations in 2012 after losing its banking relationship. At the
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Bitcoin eras
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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