CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Present And InterpretableSoftware wallet

Present and Interpretable — Software wallet

Cases where clear documentation existed for a software wallet but a custody failure still occurred. These cases reveal documentation limitations: recorded credentials that were outdated, incorrect derivation paths, or passphrases that were documented but inaccessible.

105 cases in this intersection. 70% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome and 29% in access survived. The most common recovery path is no path available.

66
Blocked
1
Constrained
27
Survived
11
Indeterminate

71% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

105 observed cases
Blocked
66 (63%)
Constrained
1 (1%)
Survived
27 (26%)
Indeterminate
11 (10%)
BitcoinTalk User kentt Recovers Encrypted Wallet via Community Brute-Force Script (June 2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In June 2013, BitcoinTalk user kentt posted confirmation of a successful wallet recovery using community-developed brute-force scripts circulated in topic 85495
125 BTC Lost on SSD After Windows Reinstall Without Backup
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
Robert23 reported on January 5, 2012, that they had lost access to 125 BTC stored in a wallet.dat file after performing a clean Windows reinstall on an SSD driv
Deep Freeze Software Erases Bitcoin Wallet.dat Before Incoming Payment
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
In September 2012, a Bitcoin user operating under the handle blackjhon909 discovered that their Bitcoin wallet had become inaccessible following an unexpected s
250 BTC Lost After Windows Profile Deletion and Repeated System Restore Overwrites
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
In early 2012, a Windows user operating under the handle kentrolla reported losing access to a Bitcoin wallet containing approximately 250 BTC. The wallet.dat f
1,300 BTC Inaccessible: BitLocker Encryption Key Lost on Failed Flash Drive
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
In June 2012, forum user mb300sd disclosed on BitcoinTalk's 'known lost bitcoins' thread that approximately 1,300 BTC had become permanently inaccessible due to
Early CPU Miner Loses 27,000 BTC to Unrecoverable Drive Failure
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Dalkore mined 27,000 BTC during Bitcoin's earliest period using CPU mining, when the network was still in its first year and coins carried no meaningful market
Opticbit Loses 2 BTC After CyanogenMod 9 Flash Without Locatable Wallet Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
On June 25, 2012, a Bitcoin user operating under the handle opticbit reported the loss of 2 BTC stored in a mobile wallet on an Android phone. The loss occurred
Campbell Simpson Discards 1,400 BTC on Failing Hard Drive Without Backup
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Campbell Simpson, editor of Gizmodo Australia, purchased approximately 1,400 Bitcoin in early 2010 when a single coin traded for roughly 1.5 cents, investing ar
Brad Yasar: Desktop-Mined Bitcoin Locked by Forgotten Passwords
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined Bitcoin on multiple desktop computers during the network's earliest years when mining was accessible to indi
Wallet Encryption Without Post-Encryption Backup: 5 BTC Change Address Lost
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
In December 2012, a BitcoinTalk user reported a custody failure involving wallet encryption and backup timing. The user had received 10 BTC across two transacti
Formatted Computer, Lost Wallet.dat Access—Recovered via Time Machine Backup
Software wallet
Survived 2011
On July 3, 2011, forum user Omega0255 reported a critical custody error with a 1 BTC mining pool payment. The user had formatted their SSD drive using a secure
Corrupted wallet.dat Recovery After Hard Drive Failure: 2011 Case Study
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2011
In May 2011, forum user zrataj (John) experienced a critical storage failure when his hard drive crashed, destroying both his primary wallet.dat file and the ba
Gabriel Abed: 800 BTC Private Keys Destroyed by Accidental Laptop Reformat
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In 2011, Gabriel Abed, co-founder of Bitt and a prominent figure in Caribbean blockchain infrastructure, lost approximately 800 BTC when a colleague accidentall
Ulti Loses 28 BTC to Incomplete SSD Migration — October 2011
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
On October 1, 2011, a Bitcointalk user identified as Ulti posted an account of a custody failure resulting from routine hardware maintenance. While upgrading hi
80 BTC Recovery After Hard Drive Format: Pywallet Raw Data Reconstruction
Software wallet
Survived 2011
In December 2011, a BitcoinTalk user's friend experienced critical wallet inaccessibility when his computer crashed. The friend brought the machine to a technic
30+ BTC Sent to Wrong Address in 2011: Private Key Never Located
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2011
In 2011, blocparty_ received approximately 30 BTC from an exchange and transferred the amount (minus fees) to what they believed was a secondary address of thei
Wallet File Swap Causes Transaction Invisibility: Blockchain Index Desynchronization (2011)
Software wallet
Survived 2011
Michael_S was running Bitcoin client version 0.3.19 on Ubuntu Linux in May 2011 and sought to improve security by splitting his holdings across two wallet.dat f
Bitcointalk User Locks Self Out of Bitcoin Core Wallet After Forgetting Encryption Passphrase
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In 2011, a user on the Bitcointalk forum reported having encrypted their Bitcoin Core wallet.dat file with a passphrase—a security practice recommended at the t
Davyd Arakhamia Loses 400 BTC After Deleting Encrypted Key File
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
Davyd Arakhamia, a Ukrainian entrepreneur and later member of the Verkhovna Rada (elected 2019), accumulated approximately 400 BTC through a business that accep
26 BTC Lost: Developer Formats Drive Containing Wallet, Gives to Mother-in-Law
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In October 2021, a Hacker News user identified as jakewins disclosed a significant custody failure from the early Bitcoin era. The user possessed 26 BTC stored
Brad Yasar: Early Miner Locks Out Thousands of BTC Across Multiple Drives
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined thousands of Bitcoin on several desktop computers during the earliest years of the network when solo mining
Seed unavailable — software wallet (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
On July 14, 2010, a BitcoinTalk user with the handle ksd5 reported a critical loss in a forum thread posted just two days after account creation. The user held
9,000 BTC Lost to Unrebacked Change Address: Early Bitcoin Wallet Flaw (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In August 2010, a Bitcoin user purchased 9,000 BTC and conducted a single test transaction: sending 1 BTC to his own address to confirm network functionality. T
8,999 BTC Lost to Non-Deterministic Wallet Change Address Design
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In 2010, a Bitcoin user held approximately 9,000 BTC in a Bitcoin Core wallet. To validate his backup and recovery procedure, he executed a test transaction to
Stone Man Loses 8,999 BTC to Unbacked Change Address After Live CD Shutdown
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In August 2010, a BitcoinTalk user known as Stone Man purchased 9,000 BTC on an exchange and transferred them to a Bitcoin client running on a Debian Linux live
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Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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