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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
United StatesSoftware wallet

United States — Software wallet

Cases from the United States involving software wallet custody failures. The US software wallet subset is the largest country-specific custody category in the archive, spanning passphrase loss, seed unavailability, and device loss patterns.

82% of determinate cases in this country with this custody type resulted in a blocked outcome — 10 points above the global rate of 72% for this custody type. This country accounts for 9% of all archive cases with this custody type. The most common recovery path is coerced transfer.

18
Blocked
0
Constrained
4
Survived
17
Indeterminate

82% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

39 observed cases
Blocked
18 (46%)
Survived
4 (10%)
Indeterminate
17 (44%)
Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0-beta Wallet Corruption on OS X Mountain Lion — Unrecovered After Five Months
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In late April 2013, jordan.dev, a Bitcoin-Qt user on macOS Mountain Lion 10.8.3, encountered a crash (EXC_BAD_ACCESS/SIGBUS) when launching Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0-bet
Encrypted wallet.dat passphrase mismatch: offline wallet creation to recovery (2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In July 2013, a user created an encrypted wallet on an Ubuntu live CD and stored the wallet.dat file offline. Several months later, in December 2013, he importe
Matthew Moody: Bitcoin Miner Dies in Plane Crash, Wallet Inaccessible
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
Matthew Moody was an early Bitcoin miner who began accumulating coins during the network's nascent period when mining remained feasible on standard consumer har
Brad Yasar: Desktop-Mined Bitcoin Locked by Forgotten Passwords
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined Bitcoin on multiple desktop computers during the network's earliest years when mining was accessible to indi
Formatted Computer, Lost Wallet.dat Access—Recovered via Time Machine Backup
Software wallet
Survived 2011
On July 3, 2011, forum user Omega0255 reported a critical custody error with a 1 BTC mining pool payment. The user had formatted their SSD drive using a secure
KnightMB: 370,000 BTC Accumulated in Early Mining, Sold or Lost to Access Failure
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2011
KnightMB, a pseudonymous user on Bitcointalk, posted in 2011 documenting an accumulation of over 370,000 BTC acquired through mining and pool operation during 2
Brad Yasar: Early Miner Locks Out Thousands of BTC Across Multiple Drives
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined thousands of Bitcoin on several desktop computers during the earliest years of the network when solo mining
10,000 Bitcoin Lost When Laptop Discarded as Junk (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In March or April 2010, while a final-year student at St. John's University in New York, an individual purchased 10,000 BTC from a local seller for approximatel
2009 Bitcoin Mining Wallet Recovery: Fragmented wallet.dat on Deleted Drive
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2009
TheMadGenius07 downloaded and briefly mined Bitcoin on a high-performance gaming rig in summer 2009, then uninstalled the Bitcoin application when mining activi
Bitcoin Transfer Stalled Between Bither Wallets—Old Laptop to New, 3+ Months Unresolved
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2008
A caregiver assisted their friend (who has disability-related constraints preventing direct technical engagement) in attempting to consolidate Bitcoin holdings.
Incomplete Mnemonic Seed Phrase: 11 of 12 Words Retained, Missing Word Recovery Feasibility
Software wallet
Indeterminate
A Bitcoin wallet user lost access to one word of their mnemonic seed phrase, retaining only 11 of 12 words. The user became aware that BIP39 uses a curated Engl
Hard Drive Discarded in Landfill: £4 Million Bitcoin Lost Without Backup
Software wallet
Indeterminate
A UK individual reportedly discarded a hard drive containing Bitcoin assets valued at approximately £4 million GBP and subsequently attempted to locate and reco
Recovering Bitcoin After Owner Death: Paper Wallet and Computer Access
Software wallet
Indeterminate
In December 2013, a user posted to Bitcoin Stack Exchange asking for help recovering Bitcoin belonging to their brother, who had died in April of that year. The
BIP38-Encrypted Paper Wallet: Permanent Loss After Forgotten Passphrase
Software wallet
Blocked
In December 2017, a new Bitcoin user created a paper wallet using BitAddress.org and elected to encrypt it with BIP38 (Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 38), a stand
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Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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