CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Japan

Bitcoin custody incidents documented in Japan. Japan's cases are disproportionately exchange-related, reflecting the country's early exchange ecosystem and the Mt. Gox collapse.

11 cases from Japan are included in this archive. 36% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome. The most frequently observed stress condition is vendor-lockout cases.

Archive analysis — 11 cases
Outcomes
36% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 33 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. Only 0% resulted in recovered access — one of the lower survival rates in the archive. 64% resulted in constrained recovery.
Primary stress condition
91% of cases involve vendor lockout. Coercion accounts for a further 9%.
Recovery path
Exchange Support is the most documented recovery path (5 cases, 45% of subset). Of those with a determinate outcome, 80% resulted in recovered or constrained access.
Documentation
91% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Scale
36% of cases involved large or very large holdings (10+ BTC).
Structural dependency
91% of cases carry a shared service dependency dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
4
Blocked
7
Constrained
0
Survived
0
Indeterminate

100% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

11 observed cases
Blocked
4 (36%)
Constrained
7 (64%)
Osaka Gang Kidnaps and Tortures Gym Member for Cryptocurrency
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2022
In June 2022, a criminal gang operating in Osaka, Japan carried out a kidnapping and torture case targeting a fellow gym member for the purpose of stealing cryp
Liquid Exchange $80M Hack (August 2021): Withdrawal Freeze, FTX Bailout, Full Acquisition
Exchange custody
Constrained 2021
On August 19, 2021, Japanese cryptocurrency exchange Liquid discovered that hackers had compromised its warm wallet infrastructure and transferred approximately
BITPoint Exchange Hack — $23M Customer Cryptocurrency Stolen, July 2019
Exchange custody
Constrained 2019
On July 12, 2019, BITPoint, operated by Tokyo-listed Remixpoint Inc., discovered unauthorised outflows totalling approximately 3.5 billion yen ($32 million USD)
Coincheck Exchange Hack: 523 Million NEM Stolen, User Withdrawals Frozen
Exchange custody
Constrained 2018
On January 26, 2018, Coincheck, a Tokyo-based cryptocurrency exchange, discovered that attackers had stolen approximately 523 million NEM tokens valued at $530
Zaif Exchange Hack: 5,966 BTC Stolen, User Funds Frozen (September 2018)
Exchange custody
Constrained 2018
On September 14, 2018, the Zaif cryptocurrency exchange operated by Tech Bureau Corp suffered a significant hot wallet breach. Attackers gained unauthorized acc
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 750,000 Bitcoin Trapped After February 2014 Withdrawal Halt
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Mt. Gox, the world's largest Bitcoin exchange at the time, announced a complete halt to all Bitcoin withdrawals on February 7, 2014. The exchange attributed the
MtGox Civil Rehabilitation Claims Process: Password Reset Barrier
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Following the MtGox collapse, Japan's civil rehabilitation framework opened a formal claims process to distribute recovered assets to affected users. However, a
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 BTC Lost, 127,000 Creditors Locked Out
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the dominant Bitcoin exchange in early 2014, processing over 70% of global Bitcoin transactions. On February 7, 2014, the platform abruptly
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: 850,000 BTC Lost, 127,000 Creditors, 10-Year Recovery
Exchange custody
Constrained 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the world's primary Bitcoin exchange from 2006 onward, handling over 70% of global Bitcoin transaction volume at its peak. The platform func
Mt. Gox Exchange Collapse: Operator Theft and 650,000 Lost Customer Bitcoin
Exchange custody
Blocked 2014
Mt. Gox operated as the dominant Bitcoin-to-fiat exchange from 2010 to 2014, handling approximately 70% of global Bitcoin trading volume at its peak. The platfo
Mt. Gox Bitcoin Withdrawal Crisis: Weeks-Long Delays Signal Terminal Operational Failure
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
By November 2013, Mt. Gox customers attempting to withdraw Bitcoin faced indefinite waiting periods, a critical escalation from earlier fiat-only delays. What h
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Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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