CustodyStress
Archive › Year and outcome › 2017 — Survived
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
2017Survives

2017 — Survived

Bitcoin custody cases from 2017 with a survived outcome. 13 cases in the archive where the incident occurred in 2017 and the documented outcome was survives.

Archive analysis — 13 cases
Outcomes
0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 69 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. 100% resulted in recovered access — above the archive average.
Primary stress condition
38% of cases involve passphrase unavailable. Device loss accounts for a further 15%.
Recovery path
Password Bruteforce is the most documented recovery path (3 cases, 23% of subset).
Documentation
85% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Geographic distribution
United States accounts for 38% of cases in this subset (5 of 13).
Structural dependency
69% of cases carry a passphrase dependency dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
0
Blocked
0
Constrained
13
Survived
0
Indeterminate

0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

13 observed cases
Survived
13 (100%)
Blockchain.info Wallet Access Failure: Platform Login System Change (2017)
Exchange custody
Survived 2017
In March 2014, a user created a Blockchain.info-hosted wallet and received a 12-word recovery passphrase as the sole access credential. The user documented the
Forgotten Bata Wallet Passphrase Recovered by Professional Service
Software wallet
Survived 2017
On August 1, 2017, a BitcoinTalk user operating under the handle InvestMeDaddy posted a recovery request after losing access to a Bata desktop cryptocurrency wa
Non-Standard Recovery Phrase Recovery: Blockchain.info 2013 Wallet with Double Encryption
Exchange custody
Survived 2017
In June 2017, a user attempted to recover Bitcoin stored in a blockchain.info wallet opened in December 2013, approximately four years prior. Access to the acco
Mark Frauenfelder's 7.4 BTC: Seed Phrase Discarded by Housecleaner, Recovered via Hardware Vulnerability
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
Mark Frauenfelder, editor-in-chief of Boing Boing and Wired contributor, purchased 7.4 Bitcoin in January 2016 for approximately $3,000 and transferred it to a
Wallet.dat Corruption After Accidental Drive Format — Recovery via Data Recovery and Pywallet
Software wallet
Survived 2017
In July 2017, AleksTo, a newcomer to Bitcoin, accidentally formatted their hard drive, destroying the only local copy of their wallet.dat file. The user immedia
Armed Kidnapping for Hardware Wallet Access: $1.8M Ether Theft — New York 2017
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Survived 2017
On November 4, 2017, Louis Meza, 35, of Jersey City, New Jersey, orchestrated a sophisticated attack against a personal acquaintance in New York City. Meza arra
Forgot Trezor PIN and Seed Words: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In 2017, during Bitcoin's price surge, a user documented their experience losing access to a Trezor hardware wallet containing approximately $30,000 in Bitcoin.
Forgotten Trezor PIN and Lost Seed Words: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In 2017, a Bitcoin holder using a Trezor hardware wallet lost access to approximately $30,000 worth of Bitcoin after forgetting both the device PIN and the back
Colorado Bitcoin Investor Death: Family Discovery and Coinbase Estate Transfer 2017
Exchange custody
Survived 2017
A Colorado-based Bitcoin investor died suddenly in 2017 without informing his family of his cryptocurrency holdings. The family had no initial awareness that he
Trezor PIN and Seed Words Forgotten: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In October 2017, a Trezor hardware wallet user discovered they had forgotten both their PIN and recovery seed words, creating a dual-layer access barrier to app
Hidden Line Feed Character Blocks Bitcoin Core Wallet Access
Software wallet
Survived 2017
In February 2017, scutzi128 documented a Bitcoin Core wallet access failure on the Bitcoin Technical Support forum. The user had encrypted their wallet with a 2
Corrupted 2013 wallet.dat Recovery via Community-Guided Disk Scanning
Software wallet
Survived 2017
In December 2017, a macOS Bitcoin Core user attempted to restore access to two wallet.dat files created in late 2013. The user had downloaded a contemporary ver
Colorado Estate: Bitcoin Recovered via Coinbase After Sudden Death (2017)
Exchange custody
Survived 2017
A Colorado resident in his twenties died unexpectedly in 2017, leaving his family to navigate an unanticipated cryptocurrency holding. The discovery came only a
Year and outcome
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

Original text
Rate this translation
Your feedback will be used to help improve Google Translate