CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
2013Survives

2013 — Survived

Bitcoin custody cases from 2013 with a survived outcome. 9 cases in the archive where the incident occurred in 2013 and the documented outcome was survives.

Archive analysis — 9 cases
Outcomes
0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 69 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. 100% resulted in recovered access — above the archive average.
Custody type
89% of cases involved software wallet, followed by exchange custody at 11%.
Primary stress condition
67% of cases involve passphrase unavailable. Vendor lockout accounts for a further 11%.
Recovery path
Password Bruteforce is the most documented recovery path (5 cases, 56% of subset). Of those with a determinate outcome, 100% resulted in recovered or constrained access.
Structural dependency
78% of cases carry a single-person knowledge dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
9 observed cases
Survived
9 (100%)
43.6 BTC Recovered via RoboForm RNG Reverse-Engineering After TrueCrypt Corruption
Software wallet
Survived 2013
Michael, a European Bitcoin holder, generated and secured a 20-character password using RoboForm in April 2013 and transferred 43.6 BTC into a software wallet.
Armory Wallet Synchronization Failure: Access Restored After Software Upgrade
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In October 2013, a BitcoinTalk user holding approximately 0.1008 BTC in an encrypted Armory wallet encountered a critical access failure. The user possessed bot
Encrypted wallet.dat passphrase mismatch: offline wallet creation to recovery (2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In July 2013, a user created an encrypted wallet on an Ubuntu live CD and stored the wallet.dat file offline. Several months later, in December 2013, he importe
Kristoffer Koch Recovers Forgotten 5,000 BTC Wallet After Four Years
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2009, Kristoffer Koch, a Norwegian engineering student, purchased 5,000 Bitcoin for approximately 150 Norwegian kroner (roughly $27 USD at the time) as resea
Bomben Recovers 2013 Bitcoin Wallet Locked by Nonstandard Private Key Encoding
Software wallet
Survived 2013
Bomben created a Bitcoin wallet in 2013 using software that implemented a nonstandard encoding for private keys, diverging from the Wallet Import Format (WIF) s
Forgotten Passphrase Locks Desktop Wallet for 8 Years; btcrecover Enables Recovery
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2013, this individual created a Bitcoin wallet using desktop software, securing it with a passphrase. The holder subsequently lost memory of that passphrase
Blockchain.info Hosted Wallet Recovery: Password Reset via Seed Phrase (2013)
Exchange custody
Survived 2013
PandaNL opened a Blockchain.info hosted wallet in 2013 and over several years forgot the account password. The user retained three critical pieces of recovery i
Multibit Wallet Recovered From Formatted Hard Drive After 5 Years
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In 2013, a Bitcoin holder stored funds in a Multibit wallet on a work desktop computer. The hard drive was subsequently formatted, and the user assumed the Bitc
BitcoinTalk User kentt Recovers Encrypted Wallet via Community Brute-Force Script (June 2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In June 2013, BitcoinTalk user kentt posted confirmation of a successful wallet recovery using community-developed brute-force scripts circulated in topic 85495
Year and outcome
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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