CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
File_deleted_no_backupEarly Bitcoin

File Deleted — No Backup — Early Bitcoin (2009–2013)

Bitcoin custody cases involving file deleted — no backup and early bitcoin (2009–2013).

16 cases in this intersection. 92% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome and 8% in access survived. The most common recovery path is no path available.

Archive analysis — 16 cases
Outcomes
92% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 23 percentage points above the archive-wide average of 69%. Only 8% resulted in recovered access — one of the lower survival rates in the archive.
Custody type
94% of cases involved software wallet, followed by exchange custody at 6%.
Primary stress condition
50% of cases involve seed phrase unavailable. Device loss accounts for a further 38%.
Documentation
38% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Scale
19% of cases involved large or very large holdings (10+ BTC).
Structural dependency
100% of cases carry a device-dependent access dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
11
Blocked
0
Constrained
1
Survived
4
Indeterminate

92% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

16 observed cases
Blocked
11 (69%)
Survived
1 (6%)
Indeterminate
4 (25%)
2013 Electrum Wallet File Blocked by Version Incompatibility
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
SirKhaal, a Bitcoin holder from the early mining era, retained an Electrum wallet file (electrum.dat) from 2013 along with its original passphrase. When attempt
Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0-beta Wallet Corruption on OS X Mountain Lion — Unrecovered After Five Months
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In late April 2013, jordan.dev, a Bitcoin-Qt user on macOS Mountain Lion 10.8.3, encountered a crash (EXC_BAD_ACCESS/SIGBUS) when launching Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0-bet
Blockchain.info iOS App Private Key Corruption: Developer Assisted One User, Denied Another
Exchange custody
Blocked 2013
In April 2013, a blockchain.info iOS app user transferred Bitcoin from Mt. Gox to a newly created address via blockchain.info's mobile application. The transact
TrueCrypt Volume Corruption Across All Backups: Wallet Recovery Attempt
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2013
In 2011, a Bitcoin user created two TrueCrypt encrypted containers on Windows 7: one holding wallet.dat, the second holding unimportant files as a control. Afte
Wallet.dat Recovery Failure After Premature Bitcoin-Qt Reinstall
Software wallet
Blocked 2013
In mid-2013, a Bitcoin user operating under the handle spoonbender encountered a custody access failure rooted in device loss and procedural error during recove
Accidental Windows User Account Deletion: 78 BTC Wallet.dat Lost Without Backup
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2012
On April 28, 2012, a Bitcoin Forum user under the alias 'spinnin' reported a critical custody failure. The user had generated 78 BTC using the official Bitcoin
250 BTC Lost After Windows Profile Deletion and Repeated System Restore Overwrites
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
In early 2012, a Windows user operating under the handle kentrolla reported losing access to a Bitcoin wallet containing approximately 250 BTC. The wallet.dat f
33.54 BTC Trapped in Corrupted Bitcoin-Qt Wallet Since 2011
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2011
In December 2017, a BitcoinTalk user identified as ketubi posted about 33.54 BTC held in a corrupted wallet.dat file from Bitcoin-Qt version 0.4.0. The last rec
MultiBit Wallet Deletion and File Corruption: ~100 BTC Permanent Loss
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In March 2013, a Bitcoin holder generated a private key from a passphrase using bitaddress.org on a Xubuntu Live CD, then imported it into MultiBit desktop wall
Wallet File Swap Causes Transaction Invisibility: Blockchain Index Desynchronization (2011)
Software wallet
Survived 2011
Michael_S was running Bitcoin client version 0.3.19 on Ubuntu Linux in May 2011 and sought to improve security by splitting his holdings across two wallet.dat f
1,000 BTC Lost After Accidental Deletion of GPG-Encrypted Dropbox Wallet File
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
An early Bitcoin contributor made a generous gift of 1,000 BTC to the brother of a Hacker News user, with a casual remark that it would someday be valuable. The
AWS EC2 and Local VM Wallet Deletion: Early Backup Failure Pattern
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
In May 2011, BitcoinTalk user opticbit reported losing approximately 0.01 BTC stored on an AWS EC2 instance that was subsequently deleted, and an additional sma
Davyd Arakhamia Loses 400 BTC After Deleting Encrypted Key File
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
Davyd Arakhamia, a Ukrainian entrepreneur and later member of the Verkhovna Rada (elected 2019), accumulated approximately 400 BTC through a business that accep
Lost Bitcoin Mining Wallet on Decommissioned PC: Data Overwritten Beyond Recovery
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In 2009 or 2010, rosnick92 and his father mined Bitcoin on a personal computer for several days, earning what he recalls as 'a few pennies per day'—an amount he
2,700 BTC Lost to Antivirus Deletion and Unverified Drive Format
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
An individual received a hard drive containing a wallet.dat file—allegedly holding approximately 2,700 BTC—sent by an early Bitcoin adopter around 2010 via emai
9,000 BTC Lost to Unrebacked Change Address: Early Bitcoin Wallet Flaw (2010)
Software wallet
Blocked 2010
In August 2010, a Bitcoin user purchased 9,000 BTC and conducted a single test transaction: sending 1 BTC to his own address to confirm network functionality. T
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Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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