CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
LargeSurvives

Large Scale — Survived

Bitcoin custody cases at large scale with a survived outcome. 5 documented cases in the archive.

Archive analysis — 5 cases
Outcomes
0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 69 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. 100% resulted in recovered access — above the archive average.
Custody type
40% of cases involved hardware wallet (single key), followed by hardware wallet with passphrase at 20%.
Recovery path
Coerced Transfer is the most documented recovery path (3 cases, 60% of subset).
Scale
100% of cases involved large or very large holdings (10+ BTC).
Time distribution
Cases span 2017–2025. 80% occurred in 2022 or later.
Structural dependency
60% of cases carry a single-person knowledge dependency tag — the most common structural factor in this subset.
5 observed cases
Survived
5 (100%)
Goiania Wrench Attack: Physical Coercion Attempt on Bitcoin Holder Thwarted by Police
Unknown custody system
Survived 2025
In June 2025, a cryptocurrency-holding businessman in Goiania, Brazil was lured to what appeared to be a legitimate business meeting. The location was instead a
Police Foil Cryptocurrency Entrepreneur Kidnapping in Nantes, France
Unknown custody system
Survived 2025
In May 2025, French police in Nantes conducted an arrest operation targeting an organized kidnapping network. Ten men, all wearing balaclavas, were apprehended
Hoboken Teacher Resists Home Invasion and €3M Bitcoin Coercion Attempt
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2022
In January 2022, three men forcibly entered the home of a 34-year-old secondary school teacher in Hoboken, Belgium. The attackers' stated objective was to coerc
Little Elm, Texas Home Invasion: $1.4M Hardware Wallet Sought but Not Found
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2022
In December 2022, armed home invaders broke into a residential property in Little Elm, Texas, and subjected the occupants to approximately three hours of tortur
Armed Kidnapping for Hardware Wallet Access: $1.8M Ether Theft — New York 2017
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Survived 2017
On November 4, 2017, Louis Meza, 35, of Jersey City, New Jersey, orchestrated a sophisticated attack against a personal acquaintance in New York City. Meza arra
Scale and outcome
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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