Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
CS-00719
No other person at QuadrigaCX had access credentials to the exchange's operational
BlockedCase description
The E&Y report confirmed that Gerald Cotten had personally controlled all exchange functions and had operated without any documented succession plan. No other person at QuadrigaCX had access credentials to the exchange's operational systems, banking accounts, or claimed cold wallets. Following his death, no technical mechanism existed to allow any third party to perform exchange operations on behalf of customers.
Custody context
| Stress condition | Owner death |
| Custody system | Exchange custody |
| Outcome | Blocked |
| Documentation | Unknown |
| Year observed | 2019 |
| Country | Canada |
Structural dependencies observed
What this illustrates
There was only one way in. When that path was gone, so was access. Access was not recoverable.
Outcome interpretation
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Source
Publicly Reported
Evidence type
News article
Evidence link
Related cases involving owner death
This archive documents observed custody survivability failures. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin losses or security incidents.
Submit a case
← All cases
Framework references
Where Bitcoin Custody Intersects Legal and Fiduciary Authority
Where custody creates gaps in estate planning, fiduciary duty, and professional responsibility.
Professional Scope Boundary Matrix
What each professional or product covers, what they do not, and where gaps form between them.
The Independent Assessment Layer in Bitcoin Custody
How independent diagnostic layers emerge when multiple parties depend on shared infrastructure.
Translate