Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
CS-00490
Two key holders resigned in January 2018 following a major investor disagreement.
ConstrainedCase description
A cryptocurrency startup's treasury was held in a 3-of-5 multisig. Two key holders resigned in January 2018 following a major investor disagreement. The resigning key holders refused to participate in key rotation until a buyout was completed. The startup could not access treasury funds for operational expenses for six weeks.
Custody context
| Stress condition | Multisig quorum failure |
| Custody system | Mobile or software wallet |
| Outcome | Constrained |
| Documentation | Unknown |
| Year observed | 2018 |
| Country | Unknown |
Structural dependencies observed
What this illustrates
The funds were held by a third party. When that party became unavailable, so did the Bitcoin. Whether full access was ultimately possible is unclear, but significant delay or outside intervention was involved.
Outcome interpretation
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Source
Publicly Reported
Evidence type
Forum post
Related cases involving multisig quorum failure
75 cases involve multisig quorum failure
569 cases involve mobile or software wallet
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This archive documents observed custody survivability failures. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin losses or security incidents.
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Framework references
Where Bitcoin Custody Intersects Legal and Fiduciary Authority
Where custody creates gaps in estate planning, fiduciary duty, and professional responsibility.
Professional Scope Boundary Matrix
What each professional or product covers, what they do not, and where gaps form between them.
The Independent Assessment Layer in Bitcoin Custody
How independent diagnostic layers emerge when multiple parties depend on shared infrastructure.
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