Device stolen — 2-of-3 multisig (2013)

Indeterminate

Case description

An early Bitcoin investment cooperative in 2013 implemented a 2-of-3 multisig arrangement across three geographically distributed members. One member disappeared without warning. A second member's key-holding device was stolen in a burglary. The cooperative could not reach the 2-of-3 threshold and was unable to distribute funds to members.

Custody context

Stress condition	Multisig quorum failure
Custody system	Mobile or software wallet
Outcome	Indeterminate
Documentation	Unknown
Year observed	2013
Country	Unknown

Structural dependencies observed

Single point of failureHardware device required

What this illustrates

There was only one way in. When that path was gone, so was access. It's not clear whether anyone ever regained access.

Outcome interpretation

Not enough information is available to determine the outcome.

Source

Publicly Reported

Evidence type

Forum post

Evidence link

https://medium.com/@wayne_huang/rsa-2015-panel-bitcoin-s-future-threats-expert-s-roundtable-based-on-150-case-studies-92cc35e68e30

Related cases involving multisig quorum failure

77 cases involve multisig quorum failure 572 cases involve mobile or software wallet View archive statistics →

This archive documents observed custody survivability failures. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin losses or security incidents. Submit a case

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Framework references

Where Bitcoin Custody Intersects Legal and Fiduciary Authority

Where custody creates gaps in estate planning, fiduciary duty, and professional responsibility.

Professional Scope Boundary Matrix

What each professional or product covers, what they do not, and where gaps form between them.

The Independent Assessment Layer in Bitcoin Custody

How independent diagnostic layers emerge when multiple parties depend on shared infrastructure.