Multisig quorum failure — software wallet (2013)

Indeterminate

Case description

An early experiment with Bitcoin multisig in 2013 used a 2-of-3 configuration shared between three parties in different countries. One key holder became uncontactable and a second key holder's device failed. With only one of three keys available the quorum could not be met, blocking access to the shared wallet for an extended period.

Custody context

Stress condition	Multisig quorum failure
Custody system	Mobile or software wallet
Outcome	Indeterminate
Documentation	Unknown
Year observed	2013
Country	Unknown

Structural dependencies observed

Single point of failureHardware device requiredInstitutional cooperation required

What this illustrates

No backup path existed. One point of failure was all it took. It's not clear whether anyone ever regained access.

Outcome interpretation

Not enough information is available to determine the outcome.

Source

Publicly Reported

Evidence type

Forum post

Evidence link

https://medium.com/@wayne_huang/rsa-2015-panel-bitcoin-s-future-threats-expert-s-roundtable-based-on-150-case-studies-92cc35e68e30

Related cases involving multisig quorum failure

75 cases involve multisig quorum failure 569 cases involve mobile or software wallet View archive statistics →

This archive documents observed custody survivability failures. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin losses or security incidents. Submit a case

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Framework references

Where Bitcoin Custody Intersects Legal and Fiduciary Authority

Where custody creates gaps in estate planning, fiduciary duty, and professional responsibility.

Professional Scope Boundary Matrix

What each professional or product covers, what they do not, and where gaps form between them.

The Independent Assessment Layer in Bitcoin Custody

How independent diagnostic layers emerge when multiple parties depend on shared infrastructure.