CustodyStress
Archive › Multisig quorum failure
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
CS-01405

The holder wanted to migrate the funds to a new wallet but required 2-of-3 signatures

Survives
Case description
A 2025 case involved a 2-of-3 multisig arrangement where one of the three hardware keys had been manufactured by a company that went out of business in 2024. The hardware wallet device was still functional but its firmware was no longer receiving security updates and had a known vulnerability disclosed in late 2024. The holder wanted to migrate the funds to a new wallet but required 2-of-3 signatures to do so. Two functional keys were available. The migration was executed successfully, but the process required identifying a firmware version that was still sufficiently secure to use for the migration transaction without exposing the device to the known vulnerability during the signing process.
Custody context
Stress conditionMultisig quorum failure
Custody systemHardware wallet (single key)
OutcomeSurvives
DocumentationUnknown
Year observed2025
CountryUnited States
Structural dependencies observed
Multi-party coordination
Outcome interpretation
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Source
Privately Reported
Evidence type
News article
Evidence link
https://anthonyspark.com/estate-planning-for-bitcoin/
Related cases involving multisig quorum failure
Multisig quorum failure — hardware wallet — United States 2025
Hardware wallet (single key) · 2025 Indeterminate
Hidden wallet discovered — institutional custody (2025)
Institutional custody · 2025 Constrained
The third device had been destroyed in a vehicle fire months before the holder's death.
Hardware wallet (single key) · 2025 Constrained
77 cases involve multisig quorum failure 274 cases involve hardware wallet (single key) View archive statistics →
This archive documents observed custody survivability failures. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin losses or security incidents. Submit a case
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Framework references
Where Bitcoin Custody Intersects Legal and Fiduciary Authority
Where custody creates gaps in estate planning, fiduciary duty, and professional responsibility.
Professional Scope Boundary Matrix
What each professional or product covers, what they do not, and where gaps form between them.
The Independent Assessment Layer in Bitcoin Custody
How independent diagnostic layers emerge when multiple parties depend on shared infrastructure.
Terms guide
Outcome terms
Survives
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Structural terms
Single-person knowledge
Recovery depended on information or capability held by one individual who was unavailable.
Institutional dependence
Recovery depended on a third-party institution or service that was inaccessible or uncooperative.
Documentation gap
Recovery depended on instructions that were missing, incomplete, or unclear.
Authority mismatch
The person with legal authority to act did not have operational access, or vice versa.
Original text
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