A 2013 early corporate Bitcoin treasury used a basic 3-of-5 multisig setup.

Indeterminate

Case description

A 2013 early corporate Bitcoin treasury used a basic 3-of-5 multisig setup. Two key holders left the company in a dispute and did not disclose their keys. A third key's hardware failed. With only two of five keys available the company fell below the 3-of-5 quorum threshold and could not move funds from the treasury wallet.

Custody context

Stress condition	Multisig quorum failure
Custody system	Exchange custody
Outcome	Indeterminate
Documentation	Unknown
Year observed	2013
Country	Unknown

Structural dependencies observed

Single point of failureHardware device requiredInstitutional cooperation required

What this illustrates

There was only one way in. When that path was gone, so was access. It's not clear whether anyone ever regained access.

Outcome interpretation

Not enough information is available to determine the outcome.

Source

Publicly Reported

Evidence type

Forum post

Evidence link

https://medium.com/@wayne_huang/rsa-2015-panel-bitcoin-s-future-threats-expert-s-roundtable-based-on-150-case-studies-92cc35e68e30

Related cases involving multisig quorum failure

77 cases involve multisig quorum failure 512 cases involve exchange custody View archive statistics →

This archive documents observed custody survivability failures. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin losses or security incidents. Submit a case

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Framework references

Where Bitcoin Custody Intersects Legal and Fiduciary Authority

Where custody creates gaps in estate planning, fiduciary duty, and professional responsibility.

Professional Scope Boundary Matrix

What each professional or product covers, what they do not, and where gaps form between them.

The Independent Assessment Layer in Bitcoin Custody

How independent diagnostic layers emerge when multiple parties depend on shared infrastructure.