CustodyStress
ArchiveRecovery Materials Colocated › Coercion
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents

Recovery Materials Colocated — Coercion

Cases where recovery materials — seed phrase, device, passphrase, backup copies, or signing keys — were stored in the same physical location. Includes cases previously classified under key colocation. Apparent redundancy collapsed because all components shared a single failure point. This page shows archive cases where both conditions were present.

10% of all Coercion cases in the archive involve this structural dependency. Among them, 89% of determinate cases resulted in a blocked outcome. The most common recovery path is coerced transfer.

11 observed cases
Blocked
8 (73%)
Survived
1 (9%)
Indeterminate
2 (18%)
Jeju Island Luxury Hotel Robbery: OTC Trader Loses $580K to Armed Gang
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2025
In January 2025, a Chinese national operating as an over-the-counter (OTC) cryptocurrency trader arranged to meet a group of six individuals at a luxury hotel o
Armed Robbery at Barcelona Cryptocurrency Company: Five Attackers, Institutional Funds Seized
Institutional custody
Blocked 2023
In January 2023, five armed men entered the Barcelona office of an unnamed cryptocurrency company. The attackers were equipped with tasers and zip ties, which t
Richmond, BC Cryptocurrency Theft: CAD $10M Stolen via Police Impersonation — 2023
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2023
In 2023, a cryptocurrency holder in Richmond, British Columbia fell victim to an escalated physical attack that demonstrated the vulnerability of self-custody h
Florida Couple Kidnapped by Crypto-Targeting Gang — Hardware Wallet Retrieved Under Duress
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2022
In September 2022, Glenn and Julia Goodwin, a retired couple in Delray Beach, Florida, were awakened shortly before midnight by intruders breaking through their
Remy St Felix Multi-State Bitcoin Home Invasion Ring — 11 Victims, $3.5M, 2022–2023
Exchange custody
Blocked 2022
Between late 2020 and July 2023, a criminal organisation led by Remy Ra St Felix, 25, of West Palm Beach Florida conducted a systematic campaign of SIM-swap fra
Little Elm, Texas Home Invasion: $1.4M Hardware Wallet Sought but Not Found
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2022
In December 2022, armed home invaders broke into a residential property in Little Elm, Texas, and subjected the occupants to approximately three hours of tortur
Florida-Based Gang Conducts 11 Coordinated Crypto Home Invasions Across US States 2022–2023
Unknown custody system
Blocked 2022
Between 2022 and 2023, a 13-member criminal network based in Florida escalated from digital theft tactics to systematic home invasions targeting cryptocurrency
Mark Geor's $4 Million Cryptocurrency Safe Stolen in New Zealand Burglary
Hardware wallet (single key)
Indeterminate 2021
In September 2021, thieves targeted the home of Mark Geor in Westmere, New Zealand. The attackers forcibly removed a safe from the property that contained appro
Armed Home Invasion and Forced Cryptocurrency Transfer in Carlisle
Exchange custody
Blocked 2020
In February 2020, armed intruders broke into a residential property in Carlisle, England. The attackers, wielding a gun and knife, forced the occupants—a couple
Masked Raiders Rob Bitcoin Exchange in Sparkhill, Birmingham (July 2019)
Exchange custody
Blocked 2019
In July 2019, a group of masked raiders conducted an armed robbery of a Bitcoin exchange located in the Sparkhill area of Birmingham, England. The incident occu
Burgled Ledger, Split Seed Across PS5 and Garden, Ex-Partner Extortion
Hardware wallet (single key)
Indeterminate
In late 2024, a Bitcoin holder implemented what appeared to be a redundant custody strategy: half the seed phrase was concealed inside a PlayStation 5 console;
Related archive views
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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