CustodyStress
Archive › Custody type and documentation › Hardware wallet (single key) — Documentation Present
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Hardware wallet (single key)Present And Interpretable

Hardware wallet (single key) — Documentation Present

Bitcoin custody cases involving hardware wallet (single key) with documentation present. 25 documented cases in the archive. 46% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access.

Archive analysis — 25 cases
Outcomes
46% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 23 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. 46% resulted in recovered access — above the archive average.
Primary stress condition
64% of cases involve coercion. Passphrase unavailable accounts for a further 20%.
Recovery path
Coerced Transfer is the most documented recovery path (14 cases, 56% of subset). Of those with a determinate outcome, 38% resulted in recovered or constrained access.
Documentation
100% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Scale
48% of cases involved large or very large holdings (10+ BTC).
Time distribution
Cases span 2011–2025. 44% occurred in 2022 or later.
11
Blocked
2
Constrained
11
Survived
1
Indeterminate

54% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

25 observed cases
Blocked
11 (44%)
Constrained
2 (8%)
Survived
11 (44%)
Indeterminate
1 (4%)
San Francisco Home Invasion: $11M Cryptocurrency Stolen at Gunpoint
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2025
In November 2025, an armed robber entered a residential home in San Francisco by posing as a delivery worker. The attacker subdued the homeowner by tying them u
Armed Home Invasion in Herzliya, Israel — 4.94 BTC Transferred Under Duress
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2025
In September 2025, armed attackers carried out a home invasion targeting a resident of Herzliya, Israel. The assailants, numbering at least three, bound the vic
Ledger Co-Founder David Balland Kidnapped in France — Physical Coercion and Partial Ransom Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Constrained 2025
In January 2025, David Balland, co-founder of Ledger, a leading hardware wallet manufacturer, and his wife were kidnapped from their home in Vierzon, France. Th
Port Moody Home Invasion: Violent Cryptocurrency Theft and Coerced Bitcoin Transfer
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2024
In April 2024, a home invasion occurred in Port Moody, British Columbia, targeting a resident's cryptocurrency holdings. The incident involved violence and coer
Victoriaville Forum Moderator Survives Two Kidnapping Attempts Over Bitcoin Holdings
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2024
In November 2024, a Bitcoin forum moderator residing in Victoriaville, Quebec, Canada, became the target of two coordinated kidnapping attempts separated by fou
Tim Heath Repels Kidnap Attempt by Fake Painters at Tallinn Rental Home
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2024
In July 2024, Tim Heath, a cryptocurrency billionaire, faced a coordinated physical attack at his rental property in Tallinn, Estonia. Men posing as painters ga
Kidnapping and Torture for Seed Phrase Extraction: Portland, Oregon 2023
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2023
In November 2023, a 21-year-old cryptocurrency holder in Portland, Oregon became the target of a coordinated abduction by four men who traveled from Florida wit
Russian Bitcoin Miner Kidnapped and Ransomed; Rescued by Police
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2023
In December 2023, a 23-year-old cryptocurrency miner was abducted from his home in Izhevsk, Russia. The perpetrators held him for ransom, attempting to coerce h
Florida Couple Kidnapped by Crypto-Targeting Gang — Hardware Wallet Retrieved Under Duress
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2022
In September 2022, Glenn and Julia Goodwin, a retired couple in Delray Beach, Florida, were awakened shortly before midnight by intruders breaking through their
Hoboken Teacher Resists Home Invasion and €3M Bitcoin Coercion Attempt
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2022
In January 2022, three men forcibly entered the home of a 34-year-old secondary school teacher in Hoboken, Belgium. The attackers' stated objective was to coerc
Little Elm, Texas Home Invasion: $1.4M Hardware Wallet Sought but Not Found
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2022
In December 2022, armed home invaders broke into a residential property in Little Elm, Texas, and subjected the occupants to approximately three hours of tortur
Zaryn Dentzel Home Invasion: Torture and Forced Bitcoin Transfer in Madrid
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2021
Zaryn Dentzel, an American co-founder of Tuenti (a major Spanish social network), became the victim of a violent home invasion in Madrid in November 2021. Attac
Mark Geor's $4 Million Cryptocurrency Safe Stolen in New Zealand Burglary
Hardware wallet (single key)
Indeterminate 2021
In September 2021, thieves targeted the home of Mark Geor in Westmere, New Zealand. The attackers forcibly removed a safe from the property that contained appro
Tomsk Miner Robbed of 86 BTC in Armed Home Attack — October 2021
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2021
In October 2021, an unidentified Bitcoin miner operating in Tomsk, Russia became the target of an armed robbery at his residence. The attackers stole approximat
Armed Home Robbery: Swedish Couple Coerced to Transfer 1M SEK Bitcoin
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2021
In February 2021, armed robbers forced their way into a private residence in Stockholm, Sweden, and coerced a married couple to surrender Bitcoin holdings value
Oslo Bitcoin Millionaire's Escape From Armed Home Invader (2019)
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2019
In May 2019, a Bitcoin millionaire residing in Oslo, Norway became the target of an armed home invasion. The attacker confronted the victim at his apartment, bu
Matthew Mellon's $193M XRP Estate: Cold Wallets, No Keys, No Plan
Hardware wallet (single key)
Constrained 2018
Matthew Mellon, a member of the prominent Mellon banking family, became a significant cryptocurrency investor in the mid-2010s. His $2 million investment in XRP
Mark Frauenfelder's 7.4 BTC: Seed Phrase Discarded by Housecleaner, Recovered via Hardware Vulnerability
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
Mark Frauenfelder, editor-in-chief of Boing Boing and Wired contributor, purchased 7.4 Bitcoin in January 2016 for approximately $3,000 and transferred it to a
Forgot Trezor PIN and Seed Words: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In 2017, during Bitcoin's price surge, a user documented their experience losing access to a Trezor hardware wallet containing approximately $30,000 in Bitcoin.
Forgotten Trezor PIN and Lost Seed Words: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In 2017, a Bitcoin holder using a Trezor hardware wallet lost access to approximately $30,000 worth of Bitcoin after forgetting both the device PIN and the back
Trezor PIN and Seed Words Forgotten: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In October 2017, a Trezor hardware wallet user discovered they had forgotten both their PIN and recovery seed words, creating a dual-layer access barrier to app
James Howell's Hard Drive: 8,000 Bitcoin Lost in Welsh Landfill
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2014
James Howell, a British-based individual, accidentally discarded a hard drive containing private keys to approximately 8,000 Bitcoin while cleaning his office a
Stefan Thomas and 7,002 Bitcoin: Locked Behind a Forgotten Passphrase
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked 2011
Stefan Thomas held 7,002 Bitcoin stored on an encrypted hard drive containing the private keys. Access to the device required a passphrase that Thomas had forgo
UK Court Blocks Landfill Excavation for Lost Bitcoin Hard Drive
Hardware wallet (single key)
Blocked
A Bitcoin holder in the United Kingdom accidentally discarded a hard drive containing an unknown quantity of Bitcoin among household waste. The device was trans
Fault Injection Attack Recovers $2M From Trezor One After Total Credential Loss
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived
A Bitcoin holder with over $2 million stored on a Trezor One hardware wallet lost access to the device after forgetting both the PIN and seed phrase. Without th
Custody type and documentation
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.