CustodyStress
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Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
Unknown custody systemSurvives

unknown — Survived

Bitcoin custody cases from unknown with a survived outcome. 20 documented cases in the archive.

Archive analysis — 20 cases
Outcomes
0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 69 percentage points below the archive-wide average of 69%. 100% resulted in recovered access — above the archive average.
Custody type
65% of cases involved software wallet, followed by hardware wallet (single key) at 15%.
Primary stress condition
50% of cases involve passphrase unavailable. Seed phrase unavailable accounts for a further 15%.
Recovery path
Password Bruteforce is the most documented recovery path (6 cases, 30% of subset). Of those with a determinate outcome, 100% resulted in recovered or constrained access.
Documentation
70% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Time distribution
Cases span 2011–2024. Only 10% occurred in 2022 or later — concentrated in earlier periods.
0
Blocked
0
Constrained
20
Survived
0
Indeterminate

0% of determinate cases resulted in blocked or constrained access.

20 observed cases
Survived
20 (100%)
Ledger Hardware Wallet: Multiple Account Discovery After Failed Seed Verification
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2024
On March 21, 2024, ContourCool attempted a long-deferred security verification of their Ledger hardware wallet by importing their seed phrase into SeedSigner an
Splashboard Trezor Passphrase Recovery: Third-Party Assisted Access Restoration
Hardware wallet with passphrase
Survived 2022
Splashboard, a Bitcoin holder with minimal public forum presence, purchased a Trezor hardware wallet in late 2021 and performed initial setup. During the setup
Forgotten 115-Character Wallet Password Recovered via GPU Typo-Bruteforce
Software wallet
Survived 2019
In August 2017, a Bitcoin enthusiast created a Bitcoin Core wallet secured by a 115-character sentence-based password and wrote it down. In June 2019, when they
Paper Wallet QR Code Case Mismatch: Single Character Locked Access for 2.5 Years
Software wallet
Survived 2018
Al Reno generated an offline paper wallet using bitaddress.org in August 2018, manually printing both public and private keys with QR codes to physical paper. H
MultiBit Classic Password Lock: Recovery Through Backup Key File Import
Software wallet
Survived 2018
A BitcoinTalk user (cluuze130) deposited Bitcoin into MultiBit Classic approximately one year before attempting withdrawal in February 2018. At the time of depo
Blockchain.info Wallet Access Failure: Platform Login System Change (2017)
Exchange custody
Survived 2017
In March 2014, a user created a Blockchain.info-hosted wallet and received a 12-word recovery passphrase as the sole access credential. The user documented the
Forgotten Bata Wallet Passphrase Recovered by Professional Service
Software wallet
Survived 2017
On August 1, 2017, a BitcoinTalk user operating under the handle InvestMeDaddy posted a recovery request after losing access to a Bata desktop cryptocurrency wa
Wallet.dat Corruption After Accidental Drive Format — Recovery via Data Recovery and Pywallet
Software wallet
Survived 2017
In July 2017, AleksTo, a newcomer to Bitcoin, accidentally formatted their hard drive, destroying the only local copy of their wallet.dat file. The user immedia
Forgot Trezor PIN and Seed Words: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In 2017, during Bitcoin's price surge, a user documented their experience losing access to a Trezor hardware wallet containing approximately $30,000 in Bitcoin.
Trezor PIN and Seed Words Forgotten: $30,000 Bitcoin Recovery
Hardware wallet (single key)
Survived 2017
In October 2017, a Trezor hardware wallet user discovered they had forgotten both their PIN and recovery seed words, creating a dual-layer access barrier to app
Hidden Line Feed Character Blocks Bitcoin Core Wallet Access
Software wallet
Survived 2017
In February 2017, scutzi128 documented a Bitcoin Core wallet access failure on the Bitcoin Technical Support forum. The user had encrypted their wallet with a 2
Block.io Custodial Lockout: 2FA Authentication Failure and Support-Dependent Recovery
Exchange custody
Survived 2016
On January 18, 2016, a BitcoinTalk user identified as 'statue' reported being locked out of their Block.io online wallet after entering an incorrect two-factor
Deleted Temporary Wallet Recovery via Private Key Forensic Extraction
Software wallet
Survived 2015
In September 2015, a Bitcoin user known as dooglus encountered a self-imposed custody failure during a transaction resend operation. After noticing an unconfirm
Hard Drive Format Recovery: 2 BTC Restored via Sector Scanning and wallet.dat Reconstruction
Software wallet
Survived 2015
In approximately 2015, marilyn4325 formatted a hard drive and installed Windows 10, intending to preserve wallet data via backup first. However, the backup beca
22.1 BTC Bitcoin-Qt Wallet Password Recovery via Community Brute Force (2014)
Software wallet
Survived 2014
In November 2014, a Bitcoin-Qt wallet containing 22.1 BTC became inaccessible when its owner forgot the passphrase. The owner had documented the password creati
Electrum Wallet Recovery After Seed Backup Loss: electrum.dat File Decryption
Software wallet
Survived 2014
In April 2014, a BitcoinTalk forum user (DarkHyudrA) experienced custody access failure after formatting their personal computer without preserving a backup cop
43.6 BTC Recovered via RoboForm RNG Reverse-Engineering After TrueCrypt Corruption
Software wallet
Survived 2013
Michael, a European Bitcoin holder, generated and secured a 20-character password using RoboForm in April 2013 and transferred 43.6 BTC into a software wallet.
Armory Wallet Synchronization Failure: Access Restored After Software Upgrade
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In October 2013, a BitcoinTalk user holding approximately 0.1008 BTC in an encrypted Armory wallet encountered a critical access failure. The user possessed bot
Blockchain.info Hosted Wallet Recovery: Password Reset via Seed Phrase (2013)
Exchange custody
Survived 2013
PandaNL opened a Blockchain.info hosted wallet in 2013 and over several years forgot the account password. The user retained three critical pieces of recovery i
80 BTC Recovery After Hard Drive Format: Pywallet Raw Data Reconstruction
Software wallet
Survived 2011
In December 2011, a BitcoinTalk user's friend experienced critical wallet inaccessibility when his computer crashed. The friend brought the machine to a technic
Country and outcome
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

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