CustodyStress
Archive › More United States cases › United States — Passphrase unavailable
Part of the CustodyStress archive of observed Bitcoin custody incidents
United StatesPassphrase unavailable

United States — Passphrase unavailable

Cases from the United States where a wallet passphrase was forgotten or lost. Passphrase-related failures account for a significant share of US self-custody access losses.

75% of determinate cases in this country with this stress condition resulted in a blocked outcome — 23 points above the global rate of 52% for this stress condition. This country accounts for 5% of all archive cases with this stress condition. The most common recovery path is password bruteforce.

Archive analysis — 12 cases
Outcomes
75% of determinate cases resulted in blocked access — 6 percentage points above the archive-wide average of 69%.
Documentation coverage
33% of cases have indeterminate outcomes — higher than the archive average of 43%.
Custody type
75% of cases involved software wallet, followed by exchange custody at 17%.
Recovery path
Password Bruteforce is the most documented recovery path (3 cases, 25% of subset).
Documentation
50% of cases had present and interpretable documentation — yet still produced a blocked or constrained outcome.
Geographic distribution
United States accounts for 100% of cases in this subset (12 of 12).
12 observed cases
Blocked
6 (50%)
Constrained
1 (8%)
Survived
1 (8%)
Indeterminate
4 (33%)
Bitcoin Core 0.21 Wallet Rejects Passphrase During Spend Attempt
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2021
In April 2021, a Bitcoin Core 0.21 user encountered a critical custody failure when attempting to send coins from an encrypted wallet. The wallet prompted for a
Alexander Halavais: Forgotten Password on 2010 Experimental Bitcoin Purchase
Software wallet
Blocked 2017
Alexander Halavais, an Associate Professor in the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Arizona State University, purchased a small quantity of Bitcoin ar
Blockchain.info Wallet: Lost Password and Recovery Phrase on Phone
Exchange custody
Blocked 2017
In June 2017, a Blockchain.info user posted on Bitcoin Stack Exchange reporting the loss of both their wallet password and 12-word recovery phrase after losing
Ledger Nano S Lockout: Seed Phrase Transcription Error and Checksum Validation Failure
Hardware wallet (single key)
Indeterminate 2017
In December 2017, a Ledger Nano S user reported being locked out of their device after completing initial setup. During device initialization, the user received
Anonymous College Student: 40 BTC Locked Behind Forgotten Wallet Password (2017)
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2017
In late 2017, during Bitcoin's historic rally to $15,000–$19,000, an anonymous college student posted on Reddit describing a custody catastrophe rooted in 2013
Kevin Durant Locked Out of Coinbase Bitcoin Account for 9 Years After 2016 Purchase
Exchange custody
Constrained 2016
Kevin Durant purchased Bitcoin on Coinbase in September 2016 at approximately $650 per coin, following repeated conversations with Golden State Warriors teammat
Zombie Paintball Incident: Written Password Loss Blocks Access to $20K Bitcoin
Software wallet
Blocked 2015
Luke purchased his first Bitcoin around 2013 for approximately $200 and continued accumulating holdings over roughly two years, investing between $15,000 and $2
Encrypted wallet.dat passphrase mismatch: offline wallet creation to recovery (2013)
Software wallet
Survived 2013
In July 2013, a user created an encrypted wallet on an Ubuntu live CD and stored the wallet.dat file offline. Several months later, in December 2013, he importe
Brad Yasar: Desktop-Mined Bitcoin Locked by Forgotten Passwords
Software wallet
Blocked 2012
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined Bitcoin on multiple desktop computers during the network's earliest years when mining was accessible to indi
KnightMB: 370,000 BTC Accumulated in Early Mining, Sold or Lost to Access Failure
Software wallet
Indeterminate 2011
KnightMB, a pseudonymous user on Bitcointalk, posted in 2011 documenting an accumulation of over 370,000 BTC acquired through mining and pool operation during 2
Brad Yasar: Early Miner Locks Out Thousands of BTC Across Multiple Drives
Software wallet
Blocked 2011
Brad Yasar, a Los Angeles-based entrepreneur, mined thousands of Bitcoin on several desktop computers during the earliest years of the network when solo mining
BIP38-Encrypted Paper Wallet: Permanent Loss After Forgotten Passphrase
Software wallet
Blocked
In December 2017, a new Bitcoin user created a paper wallet using BitAddress.org and elected to encrypt it with BIP38 (Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 38), a stand
More United States cases
Related pages
Terms guide
Survived
Access remained possible under the reported conditions.
Constrained
Access remained possible, but only with delay, dependence, or significant difficulty.
Blocked
Access was not possible under the reported conditions.
Indeterminate
There was not enough information to determine the outcome.
Survivability
The degree to which a custody system maintains the possibility of authorized recovery under stress.
Archive inclusion criteria

This archive documents cases where a legitimate owner, heir, or authorized party encountered barriers accessing or recovering Bitcoin due to a failure in the custody arrangement. The central question for inclusion is: did the custody structure fail a legitimate access or recovery attempt?

A case must satisfy all three of the following to be included:

  1. Legitimate access attempt. The person attempting to access or recover the Bitcoin was the owner, a designated heir, an executor, a legal authority, or another party with a legitimate claim — not a thief, attacker, or unauthorized third party.
  2. Custody structure failure. The failure was caused by a property of the custody arrangement — missing credentials, structural dependencies, documentation gaps, knowledge concentration, legal barriers, or institutional constraints — not market conditions, individual-level fraud or theft, or protocol-level issues. Platform-level failures that block legitimate user access are in scope regardless of their cause.
  3. Documentable outcome or access constraint. The case must have a stated or inferable outcome: access blocked, access constrained, access delayed, or access eventually achieved through a recovery path. Cases with entirely unknown outcomes are included only where the structural failure is documented and the constraint is unambiguous.
  • Owner death or incapacity — Bitcoin held in self-custody that becomes inaccessible to heirs or designated parties because credentials, documentation, or operational knowledge were not transferred
  • Passphrase loss — BIP39 passphrase forgotten or unavailable, blocking access to a funded wallet even where the seed phrase is present
  • Seed phrase or wallet backup unavailable — no independent recovery path existed or the backup was destroyed, lost, or never created
  • Device loss without independent backup — hardware wallet, phone, or computer lost or destroyed with no recovery path outside the device
  • Documentation absent or ambiguous — heirs or executors cannot determine that Bitcoin exists, which wallet holds it, or how to access it
  • Knowledge concentration — only one person knew the procedure, passphrase, or access method; that person is dead, incapacitated, or unreachable
  • Multisig quorum failure — a threshold signature arrangement cannot be completed because signers are unavailable, uncooperative, incapacitated, or have lost their keys
  • Legal authority / access mismatch — a court order, probate ruling, or power of attorney establishes legal entitlement but provides no technical path to access
  • Institutional custody barrier — exchange or platform hacks, insolvency, regulatory seizure, or operational failure that caused a access constraint or failure for legitimate users, whether temporary, prolonged, or permanent. The failure of the custodian to remain available or solvent is itself the in-scope event.
  • Forced relocation or geographic constraint — physical access to a device or location required for recovery is blocked by displacement, border restrictions, or political circumstances
  • Coercion — the holder was compelled under threat to transfer Bitcoin or disclose credentials during an access event
  • Hidden asset discovery — heirs or executors locate a wallet or account but cannot access it due to missing credentials or operational knowledge
  • Market losses, investment losses, yield scheme losses, or Ponzi scheme losses
  • Hacks or theft targeting an individual's personal security (phishing, SIM swap, social engineering, malware) where the custody architecture itself did not fail
  • Unauthorized transfers where the holder's custody system was not the cause of the failure
  • Ordinary transaction mistakes — wrong-address sends, fee errors, mistaken amounts
  • Protocol-level failures — cryptographic vulnerabilities, consensus bugs, firmware integrity failures
  • Deliberate burns or tribute burns
  • Cases where the stated loss is unverifiable and no structural custody failure is described

Cases are drawn from public sources including forum posts, news reporting, court documents, academic research, and direct submissions. Each case is reviewed against the inclusion criteria above before publication. Source material is retained and available on request for documented cases.

The archive is observational and descriptive. It does not attempt to document all Bitcoin custody failures — only those meeting the criteria above with sufficient documentation to describe the structural failure and its outcome.

Original text
Rate this translation
Your feedback will be used to help improve Google Translate