Secure but Accessible Bitcoin Storage

Balancing Security With Ongoing Accessibility

This memo is published by CustodyStress, an independent Bitcoin custody stress test that produces reference documents for individuals, families, and professionals.

Observed Pattern

A bitcoin holder wants storage that does two things. It protects funds from theft or loss. It also allows the holder to use funds when needed. These two goals pull in different directions.

Accessibility matters for daily spending, emergencies, and involving other people. The holder may need to move bitcoin quickly. A spouse may need access during illness. An executor may need access after death.

The search for secure but accessible bitcoin storage reflects this tension. The holder makes choices during calm periods. Those choices shape what happens when the holder becomes unavailable. The tradeoffs remain invisible until stress arrives.

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Observed Pattern

Accessibility reduces friction during normal use. The holder can move funds quickly. Transactions happen without delay. Daily life feels easier.

The same choices that create accessibility also create exposure. More access paths mean more ways for funds to move. Each path depends on something: a password, a device, an institution, another person.

Security-focused designs work differently. They add friction on purpose. Extra steps slow down access. This protects against theft but creates delay when legitimate access is needed.

Neither approach eliminates failure. Each approach moves failure to a different place. Accessible bitcoin storage fails when dependencies break. Protected storage fails when coordination breaks.

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Access Dependency

Accessible systems depend on things outside the bitcoin itself. A phone app depends on the phone working. An exchange account depends on the exchange existing. A shared wallet depends on another person cooperating.

These dependencies work fine during normal times. The holder has the phone. The exchange is open. The other person is available. Access feels simple.

Under stress, dependencies fail in different ways. The phone is lost. The exchange freezes accounts. The other person is unreachable. What felt accessible becomes blocked. The access path existed, but the things it depended on did not survive.

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Security Layering

Adding protection creates layers. A hardware wallet adds one layer. A PIN adds another. A passphrase adds a third. Each layer blocks unwanted access.

Each layer also adds coordination burden. Someone recovering funds needs to pass through every layer. Missing one piece blocks everything. The holder knows how to navigate the layers. An heir may not.

Layers designed to block attackers also block legitimate recovery. The system cannot tell the difference. A thief and an executor face the same barriers. Bitcoin security vs accessibility plays out through these layers.

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Human Mediation

Accessibility often depends on people. A spouse knows a password. A business partner holds a key. A trusted friend can help in emergencies. Human involvement creates flexible access paths.

Human mediation introduces new failure modes. People forget. People become unavailable. People die. Relationships change. The person who was supposed to help may not be there when help is needed.

The holder assumes these people will be available and willing. The assumption holds during calm periods. Under stress, human dependencies prove fragile. Accessible designs that rely on people fail when those people cannot participate.

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Timing Sensitivity

Accessibility means different things at different times. The holder accesses funds in seconds. An heir may need weeks or months. What feels instant to one person feels impossible to another.

Custody systems are built for the holder's timeline. Quick access matters for daily use. The design assumes the holder will always be present to use it.

Inheritance operates on a different timeline. The holder is gone. The heir starts from zero. Every access path requires discovery, verification, and execution without help. Accessible bitcoin storage for the holder may be inaccessible bitcoin storage for the heir.

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A Scenario Where Accessibility Blocks Inheritance

A man keeps his bitcoin on a phone app. He uses Face ID to unlock the app. He can send bitcoin in seconds. The setup feels convenient and protected.

The man dies. His wife has his phone but cannot unlock the app. Face ID requires his face. The backup password is stored in a password manager she cannot access. The app company cannot help without the account credentials.

The system was designed for his convenience. It assumed he would always be present. His wife has the device but not the access path. The accessible design became a barrier.

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A Scenario Where Security Layers Block Recovery

A woman uses a hardware wallet with a PIN and a passphrase. She writes down her seed phrase and stores it in a safe. She tells her brother he is her backup. She does not explain the passphrase.

The woman becomes incapacitated. Her brother finds the safe. He finds the seed phrase. He buys the same hardware wallet model. He enters the seed phrase. He sees a zero balance.

The passphrase creates a hidden wallet. Without it, the seed phrase shows an empty account. The brother does not know a passphrase exists. He assumes the funds are gone. The security layer worked as designed. It blocked everyone, including the person who was supposed to recover the funds.

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A Scenario Where Shared Access Fails Under Stress

Two business partners share a multisig wallet. Either one can spend with both signatures. They designed the system for flexibility. Each partner can access funds with the other's cooperation.

One partner dies suddenly. The surviving partner needs funds for business expenses. He has his own key but needs a second signature. The deceased partner's key sits on a laptop the family will not release.

Weeks pass. Lawyers get involved. The family does not understand bitcoin. The surviving partner has legal claims but no technical access. The shared system required cooperation. Death ended cooperation. Bitcoin inheritance accessibility depended on a relationship that no longer exists.

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Accessibility During the Holder's Lifetime

Quick access supports daily use. The holder spends, transfers, and responds to emergencies. Convenience depends on memory, working devices, and continuous account access.

This works while the holder remains capable. Memory stays intact. Devices stay functional. Accounts stay active. The holder navigates the system without thinking about it.

Loss of capacity changes everything immediately. The holder cannot remember passwords. The holder cannot operate devices. The holder cannot explain the system to anyone else. What worked yesterday stops working today. Accessibility assumptions fail the moment the holder's capacity changes.

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Accessibility During Inheritance

Heirs need access without the holder's help. They cannot ask questions. They cannot request demonstrations. They start with whatever documentation exists and whatever they can discover.

Systems optimized for the holder's convenience may block third parties. Biometric locks require the holder's body. Password managers require the holder's master password. Trusted devices require the holder's presence.

Delays compound. Each blocked path takes time to work around. Accessible designs become bottlenecks. The heir spends months doing what the holder did in seconds. Secure bitcoin custody access for the holder does not transfer to the heir.

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Bitcoin Security vs Accessibility Tension

Security reduces attack surfaces. Fewer access paths mean fewer ways for attackers to reach funds. This protects bitcoin during normal times.

Accessibility increases access paths. More paths mean more ways for legitimate users to reach funds. This supports convenience and emergency use.

Each additional access path becomes a dependency. Each dependency can fail. Adding accessibility adds potential failure points. Adding security adds coordination burden. Improving one dimension reshapes failure in the other.

The tension does not resolve. It shifts. A holder who prioritizes accessibility faces exposure risks. A holder who prioritizes security faces coordination risks. The tradeoff persists regardless of custody design.

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What Does Not Change

Legal authority does not create technical access. An executor with court documents still needs passwords and keys. A trustee with legal power still needs to find and operate the custody system. Law and technology remain separate.

Neither security nor accessibility eliminates failure. Both reshape where failure occurs. Accessible systems fail through dependency breakdown. Protected systems fail through coordination breakdown. The failure moves but does not disappear.

Custody systems reflect choices made during calm conditions. Those choices assumed certain things about the future. Some assumptions hold. Some do not. The system reveals its tradeoffs only when stress tests them.

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Assessment

Secure but accessible bitcoin storage involves competing goals. Protection reduces exposure. Accessibility increases usability. Each gain in one area creates pressure in the other.

Accessible designs depend on credentials, devices, institutions, and people. These dependencies work during normal times. Under stress, they fail in ways the holder did not anticipate. What felt accessible to the holder may be inaccessible to heirs.

This memo describes how accessibility choices reshape inheritance outcomes. It explains the observed tension between protection and execution without prescribing custody design. The tradeoff exists. It does not resolve. It shifts.

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System Context

Examining Bitcoin Custody Under Stress

Only One Person Knows Bitcoin Password as Single Point of Failure

Password Manager Dependency as an Inheritance Failure Surface

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