Bitcoin Backup Path Testing

Testing Recovery Paths Beyond Backup Copies

This memo is published by CustodyStress, an independent Bitcoin custody stress test that produces reference documents for individuals, families, and professionals.

What Path Testing Examines

A custody system claims redundancy. Multiple backups exist. The seed phrase is stored in two places. A hardware wallet and a paper backup both provide access. The owner believes that if one path fails, another path remains available.

The question is whether these paths are truly independent. Bitcoin backup path testing examines whether multiple recovery routes represent distinct paths or whether they collapse into the same dependencies under stress. Two backups stored in different locations may still depend on the same person to interpret them. Two devices may still require the same passphrase that exists only in one memory.

The test assumes at least one path is unavailable or degraded when recovery is attempted. It asks: when one path fails, do the others survive? Or do they fail together because they share something that failed?


What Path Testing Examines

Bitcoin backup path testing examines the independence of recovery routes. Each path from backup to recovered access is traced. The test identifies what each path depends on: which people, which locations, which devices, which knowledge, which services.

Where paths share dependencies, the test notes the overlap. Two paths that both require the same person to act are not independent with respect to that person's availability. Two paths that both require the same passphrase are not independent with respect to that passphrase's accessibility. Two paths that both depend on the same service are not independent with respect to that service's operation.

The test does not evaluate whether backups are correct or complete. It examines whether they represent distinct routes to recovery or variations of the same route.


Copies Versus Paths

A common pattern in custody systems is multiple copies of the same artifact. The seed phrase is written on paper and stored in a safe. A second copy is stored at a relative's house. A third copy is engraved on metal and kept in a safe deposit box. Three copies exist.

Three copies are not necessarily three paths. All three copies may require the same passphrase to use. All three copies may require the same person to interpret the instructions. All three copies may require the same wallet software that only the owner knew how to operate.

Copy-based redundancy creates the appearance of resilience. The owner sees three backups and feels protected. But if all three copies depend on the same hidden requirement, they represent one path stored in three places, not three independent paths.

Bitcoin redundancy testing distinguishes between artifacts and paths. An artifact is a thing that exists. A path is a complete route from artifact to recovered access. Multiple artifacts may share a single path if they converge on shared dependencies.


Hidden Choke Points

Paths often share hidden choke points—single dependencies that multiple paths require. These choke points may not be obvious. They hide in assumptions about who will act, what they will know, and what resources they will have.

A common choke point is a single person. The owner created all the backups. The owner understands how to use them. The owner is the only one who can interpret the documentation. When the owner is unavailable, all paths that depend on the owner's interpretation fail together.

Another common choke point is a single location. The seed phrase backup and the hardware wallet are stored in different places, but the instructions for using both are stored together. If the instructions are lost, both paths become blocked.

A third common choke point is a single piece of knowledge. The passphrase protects the wallet regardless of which backup is used. If the passphrase is unknown, all paths that require it become unusable.

Bitcoin backup dependency overlap appears when hidden choke points are identified. The paths looked separate until the shared dependency became visible.


A Scenario Where Paths Collapse

A woman creates what she considers a robust backup system. She stores her seed phrase in three locations: her home safe, her sister's house, and a bank safe deposit box. She stores her hardware wallet separately from all three seed phrase copies. She considers this arrangement redundant.

She uses a passphrase on her wallet. She does not write the passphrase down because she considers it a security risk. She remembers it easily. She has used it for years.

The woman dies unexpectedly. Her husband attempts to recover the Bitcoin. He finds the seed phrase in the home safe. He does not know about the passphrase. He restores the wallet and sees a zero balance. He concludes the Bitcoin is gone.

Later, the sister finds the seed phrase copy at her house. She gives it to the husband. He tries again with the same result. The husband eventually learns about the safe deposit box and retrieves that copy. Same result.

Three seed phrase copies existed in three different locations. All three paths required the same passphrase. The passphrase existed only in the woman's memory. When she died, all three paths failed together. The redundancy was an illusion. Three copies of an artifact created one path with a single point of failure.


Dependency Overlap and Correlated Failure

When paths share dependencies, they fail in correlated ways. The same event that blocks one path blocks the others. This is the opposite of redundancy. True redundancy means that the failure of one path does not affect the others. Dependency overlap means that one failure cascades across paths.

Testing backup paths bitcoin custody systems reveals where correlated failure is possible. The test asks: what events would cause multiple paths to fail simultaneously? If the answer is "the death of one person" or "the loss of one piece of knowledge" or "the failure of one service," then the paths are not independent with respect to those events.

The goal of path testing is not to eliminate correlation—that may not be possible. The goal is to identify it. Knowing where paths overlap allows for understanding of what the redundancy actually protects against and what it does not.


Shared Timing Dependencies

Paths may share timing dependencies that cause synchronized degradation. All paths may be subject to the same delays: probate proceedings, grief that prevents action, legal disputes that freeze assets.

During these delays, all paths degrade together. Memory fades for all paths equally. Documents become harder to find as time passes. Helpers become less available. Services change their policies. The paths do not fail independently over time; they fail together as shared timing pressures affect them all.

Bitcoin backup path testing accounts for timing. The test asks: if recovery is delayed by six months, do all paths degrade equally? If the answer is yes, the paths share timing dependencies. Their apparent independence at the moment of death does not persist through the delays that death typically involves.


Shared Authority Constraints

Paths may share authority constraints. The same legal document may govern access to all backups. The same executor may control all recovery attempts. The same court may have jurisdiction over all paths.

When authority is shared, blocking one path through authority constraints blocks them all. If the executor is unable or unwilling to act, all paths that require the executor's involvement become blocked. If a court freezes assets pending a dispute, all paths subject to that court's jurisdiction are frozen.

Shared authority is often invisible in the design of backup systems. The owner thinks about where to store artifacts, not about who will have authority over them. But authority constraints apply to all artifacts under the same legal umbrella, regardless of where they are physically stored.


Interpretive Knowledge as a Shared Dependency

Perhaps the most common shared dependency is interpretive knowledge—the understanding needed to use backups. Different backups may be stored in different places, but using any of them may require the same knowledge: which wallet software to use, what the derivation path is, whether a passphrase exists, how the pieces fit together.

This knowledge often lives in one person's head. The owner understood the system. The owner could use any of the backups because the owner knew how. Others may have the artifacts without having the understanding.

When interpretive knowledge is shared across paths, all paths fail when that knowledge becomes unavailable. The seed phrase in the safe, the seed phrase at the sister's house, and the seed phrase in the safe deposit box all require the same understanding to use. If no one remaining has that understanding, all three backups become equally useless.

Bitcoin backup path testing identifies where interpretive knowledge creates shared dependency. The paths may be physically separate while being cognitively unified—all requiring the same understanding that may not have been transferred.


What Path Independence Looks Like

Truly independent paths share minimal dependencies. They involve different people, different locations, different knowledge requirements, and different timing constraints. The failure of one path does not predict the failure of another.

Independent paths are difficult to create. Every path requires some things: artifacts, knowledge, authority, and execution capability. Ensuring that no two paths share any of these requirements is challenging. Most custody systems achieve partial independence at most—paths that are independent with respect to some factors but not others.

Path testing reveals the degree of independence. It shows which dependencies are shared and which are distinct. It identifies where paths converge and where they remain separate. This information describes the actual redundancy structure, which may differ from the intended structure.


Redundancy Claims Versus Redundancy Reality

Custody systems often claim redundancy. "I have three backups." "My Bitcoin can be recovered through multiple routes." "If one thing fails, I have alternatives." These claims describe intentions. They may not describe reality.

Testing backup paths bitcoin arrangements compares claims to reality. The test asks: are these paths actually independent, or do they share dependencies that would cause them to fail together? The answer often reveals that claimed redundancy is less robust than it appears.

This is not a criticism of custody design. True redundancy is hard to achieve. The point of testing is not to judge but to describe. Knowing what the redundancy actually provides is more useful than believing what it was intended to provide.


What Testing Does Not Examine

Path testing does not examine whether individual backups are correct. A seed phrase may be accurately recorded or may contain errors. Path testing does not verify accuracy. It assumes the artifacts are what they claim to be and examines whether the paths they create are independent.

Path testing does not examine whether paths will succeed. A path may be independent of other paths while still being blocked by its own internal problems. The test examines inter-path relationships, not intra-path viability.

Path testing does not prescribe how to build redundancy. It describes the redundancy that exists. Whether that redundancy is sufficient depends on factors outside the scope of the test: what risks matter, what resources are available, what tradeoffs are acceptable.


The Boundary of the Test

Path testing has boundaries. It examines whether paths are independent under stated assumptions. Different assumptions would produce different results. A path that is independent under normal conditions may share dependencies under extreme conditions. A path that appears dependent may become independent if certain changes are made.

The test models a specific scenario: at least one path is unavailable, and recovery is attempted through alternatives. It asks whether the alternatives actually provide different routes or merely different copies of the same route. Within this scenario, the test reveals path structure. Outside this scenario, other factors dominate.


What the Result Represents

The result of bitcoin backup path testing is a description of modeled path independence. It shows where paths share dependencies and where they diverge. It identifies choke points, timing correlations, authority constraints, and interpretive knowledge requirements that create overlap.

The result does not represent backup quality. Backups may be high quality while paths are not independent. Backups may be low quality while paths are structurally distinct. Path independence and backup quality are different properties.

The result does not represent recovery likelihood. Independent paths may all fail for unrelated reasons. Dependent paths may succeed because the shared dependency happened to be available. The test describes structure, not outcomes.


Conclusion

Bitcoin backup path testing examines whether multiple recovery routes are meaningfully independent or whether they collapse into shared dependencies under stress. The test traces each path from backup to recovered access and identifies where paths share people, locations, devices, knowledge, or services.

Multiple copies of an artifact are not necessarily multiple paths. Copies that share the same interpretation requirements, the same passphrase, or the same person's involvement represent one path stored in multiple places. Hidden choke points cause paths to fail together when the shared dependency fails.

Shared timing dependencies cause synchronized degradation. Shared authority constraints cause correlated blocking. Shared interpretive knowledge causes all paths to become unusable when that knowledge is unavailable. These overlaps reduce effective redundancy below what the number of backups suggests.

The result of path testing is a description of actual redundancy structure. It distinguishes between repeated artifacts and distinct recovery paths. It reveals where claimed redundancy provides real protection and where it provides only the appearance of protection. The test describes what exists, allowing for understanding of what the backup system actually provides.


System Context

Examining Bitcoin Custody Under Stress

Auditing My Bitcoin Wallet

Bitcoin Backup Incomplete

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